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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1886

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DESCRIPTION OF AMERICAN TANK M60A3

Sofia ARMEYSKI PREGLED in Bulgarian No 4, 1981 p 127

[Article written from foreign military information by Candidate of Technical Sciences, Engr-Col N. Ivanov]

[Text] According to information in the foreign press, in the units and formations of the U.S. ground forces stationed in West Germany, the M60A1 tanks are to be replaced by the improved M60A3 tanks and up to 1982 1,696 such tanks are to be delivered. In addition, around 1,700 of the M60A1 tanks there will be modernized up to the level of the M60A3.

The M60A3 tank is a modernized version of the M60A1 tank (in terms of external appearance they are the same) and they differ primarily in the increased firing accuracy due to gun stabilization and the incorporation of an improved fire control system which includes an AN/WG-2 laser range finder and a M-21 electronic ballistic computer. The foreign press has pointed out that the probability of hitting a stationary target (2.3 x 2.3 m in size) at a distance of 2,000 m is around 70 percent for the M60A3 tank while it is 23 percent for the M60A1.

The massive night-vision sight located in front of the gunner is to be replaced by the AN/VSG-2 heat-sensing sight which has better performance and makes it possible to detect targets at greater ranges.

In the place of the unreliable 7.62-mm M-219 machine gun which is coupled with the gun [cannon], a Belgian machine gun has been provided of the same caliber (designated the M240). A heat-insulating mantle has been supplied for the gun barrel.

For laying smokescreens, it is possible to use the M239 grenade launchers which are mounted on the sides of the front of the turret as well as the thermal smoke generating equipment (there is an injector nozzle in the engine exhaust system).

In the future they plan to improve the suspension and the tracks of the M60A3 tank, the reliability of its engine is to be increased, a portion of the unit of fire will be shifted from the turret to the body, and a commander's turret (with a machine gun) is to be provided as is used on the XM1 tank.

The basic specifications of the M60A3 tank are: a combat weight of 50 tons, a unit of fire of 63 rounds for the gun, a power of 750 hp for the diesel engine, a maximum speed of 48 km an hour and a range of 480 km.

As is noted in the foreign press, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia intend to buy the M60A3.

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FOREIGN ARMIES: HOW TO FIGHT AIR LANDINGS

Sofia ARMEYSKI PREGLED in Bulgarian No 4, 1981 pp 122-126

[Article written from materials in the foreign press by Candidate of Military Sciences, Col Ivan Ivanov: "Combating Airborne Assault Forces"]

[Text] Our probable enemies feel that the countering of airborne assault forces is one of the basic measures in organizing and conducting a defensive and offensive engagement (operation). According to them there are conditions for landing airborne assault forces on plains and mountain-plains terrain, particularly in the capturing of important inaccessible or strongly defended areas and installations by the enemy.

The combating of enemy airborne assault forces is expressed in the carrying out of a range of measures for holding important areas or installations in the tactical and operational depth. This objective can be achieved only by the destruction of the landed enemy assault forces.

The basic measures in organizing the countering of enemy airborne assault forces are: the organizing of direct security and defense for the threatened installations; the organizing of antiairborne defense and the cooperation between the armed services and branches of troops in the areas where an enemy landing of airborne forces is probable; the preparation of the men and equipment to combat the enemy airborne assault forces; the organizing of dependable reconnaissance and effective antiairborne defenses at the threatened objectives and areas; the organizing of an efficiently operating counterintelligence service in the rear of one's own forces.

In countering enemy airborne assault forces, the troops are given the following preliminary crucial missions: discovering the plan of action of the enemy landing forces; prompt notification of the appropriate military and civilian bodies entrusted with the countering of an enemy airborne assault force; warning the subunits and units, the higher levels of command, the command posts and so forth which can be the object of the airborne assault forces. A task of primary significance is the destruction of the airborne assault forces while still in their assembly areas before loading into the aircraft or helicopters. It is recommended that this be done with all available means, including the use of nuclear missiles. If this is impossible, the airborne assult forces must be disrupted or destroyed during their flight to the landing area or directly after their landing.

In the opinion of our probable enemies, responsibility for organizing the countering of enemy airborne assault forces rests with the Supreme High Command of the given theater of war. It provides leadership over these activities through the commanders of the army group and the commanders of the air force, the chiefs of the territorial commands and the commanders of the internal forces (the police, gendarmerie and so forth) where such exist.

Our probable enemies divide the theater of war into the combat and rear zones (the resupply zone).

In the combat zone, in addition to the commanders of the army groups, responsibility for destroying the airborne assault forces rests on the corresponding leaders of the territorial military commands. They are obliged to maneuver the troops which have been assigned to destroy the airborne assault forces.

In the range of action of a field army, a combat zone includes the forward combat and rear area.

The army corps and divisions are located in the forward combat area. Their commanders bear responsibility for destroying the enemy airborne assault forces.

In the rear resupply zone are found the basic rear bodies, the means of supply and the supply and evacuation routes.

For countering the enemy airborne assault forces, a special plan is worked out on the basis of the obtained intelligence data (political, economic and military) and the capabilities of the rear to combat the airborne assault forces. The plan provides calculations for the disposition of troops to destroy the airborne assault forces, their missions, the area of their operation, the objectives which they are to defend and cooperation between the various resources which are to destroy the airborne assault forces.

Prior to elaborating the plan, the objects which are to be defended as well as the resources which will defend these objects are determined. After this the method of operation of these resources is clarified. A great deal of attention is given to planning close cooperation between the troop units and the police forces which are to be involved in defending the objects and eliminating the airborne assault forces.

The measures in the plan are coordinated in terms of time and place with those for air defense, the created obstacles and barriers, fire support, cooperation in destroying the enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups, as well as the equipment and bodies for warning and radio electronic countermeasures. Particular attention is given to organizing cooperation between the national troops in the given theater of war and the NATO-level troops and installations, mainly those of the United States. For this purpose it has been recommended that close contact be established between the command of the theater of war and the appropriate national command. For example, in the Southern European Theater of War this would be between its command in Naples with the military commands of Italy, Greece and Turkey and between the commands of the army group and territorial commands, between the corps and divisional commands and the appropriate smaller territorial commands.

In determining the men and equipment which are to be used for eliminating the airborne assault forces, they proceed from the nature and size of the expected airborne party; the importance of the area (objective) which is to be defended, the men and equipment available to the army commands for combating the airborne assault forces; the men and equipment which the higher commands possess for this purpose. For example, in the rear area of an army corps, for combating airborne assault forces, one-third of the personnel of the corps subunits can be assigned to combat the airborne assault forces. Operational groups are made from this personnel and each of these groups can have from 4,000 to 5,000 men, in figuring that each installation is to be defended by a platoon or company. The commander of an army corps can keep a mobile operational group in reserve and this would consist of a division, regiment or battalion as well as special purpose units and local (territorial) military or paramilitary groupings. It is felt that a field army or army group is not able to assign such a group and for this reason the task of countering the airborne assault forces is placed on the territorial troops or the formations of Civil Defense. In addition, the commanders of field armies for this purpose can temporarily use a portion of newly mobilized units and subunits which are undergoing special training in the army's area of operations.

In order to avoid a surprise attack, it is recommended that constant reconnaissance and observation of an airborne enemy be organized. In reconnaissance the task is set of promptly detecting the area of concentration and embarcation of the airborne party, the landing area, the composition of the airborne party, the preparations for the landing and the possible nature of its operations. In bearing in mind that the embarcation area of an airborne assault force is a significant distance away from the combat line, the carrying out of this task is entrusted to the intelligence bodies of the superior field forces which have the resources to carry it out.

An alert on the level of a theater of war is carried out by the previously organized distant and close reconnaissance and warning system. The distant reconnaissance system is set up through the leading air force bodies. The radar subunits, those of air defense and the reconnaissance satellites provide an opportunity to promptly obtain the necessary information and to alert the appropriate commands in order to promptly take measures to combat enemy airborne assault forces.

The near reconnaissance and warning system is organized on a level of the rear areas of the field forces (armies) and the combat zone. Through this system information is obtained on the preparations of the airborne assault forces which will be landed in these areas. The system includes ground and airborne observation posts, air defense radars, signaling posts, signaling devices in the area of the objectives and subunits, radio monitoring and intercept posts and mobile patrols equipped with radio electronic devices.

The near reconnaissance and warning system operates closely with the distant reconnaissance and warning system as well as the air defense resources and air forces located in its area.

It is recommended that the command of each rear area maintain dependable contact with the chief responsible for the security and defense of the installation. In addition there should be constant and uninterrupted contact with the police and the subunits assigned to guard and defend the installations and with the territorial bodies in the given area.

As a rule, the security for rear installations is inspected by the servicing subunits and formations of the military police and gendarmerie. The security and defense are organized primarily against attack by an air enemy, including airborne assault troops. In the area of the defended installation, wire obstacles, man-made obstacles and minefields are built, as well as the laying of single mines along certain axes. Firing positions are prepared for the subunits which will defend the installation.

At present the system for the security and defense of installations of our probable enemies in a theater of war includes three zones: a limited access zone; a restricted traffic zone and a prohibited zone. Entry into these zones is restricted or completely prohibited.

The guarded installations are equipped with various automatic radio and warning devices which provide a visual and sound signal with the opening of the entrances to the secured installations. These devices signal the appearance of "undesirables" in the area of the installation.

Ordinarily the security for a given rear installation consists of a platoon or company (from 60 to 300 men) of the military police or gandarmerie or of the military subunit stationed in the area of the installation.

With the commencement of military operations, the security and defense of threatened installations are strengthened. They are turned into centers of resistance the territory of which is covered by fire from the air.

For assisting the guarding the defending subunits, mobile operational groups are created. The make-up is determined by the commanders and chiefs who are responsible for countering airborne assault forces. The concentration areas for these groups are set in the aim of providing an opportunity to move most rapidly into the landing area of the airborne assault force and deployment for combat operations.

When a command possesses sufficient resources to defend a rear area, it begins creating a reserve. This is formed from the subunits which are carrying out combat missions in the area.

For destroying airborne assault forces, our probable enemies plan the wide use of helicopter fire power and air defense weapons. It is felt that an air defense system organized with the extensive use of fire aircraft, antiaircraft missiles and conventional air defense weapons as well as firearms is capable of destroying enemy air transports and helicopters carrying the airborne assault forces during the flight to the landing area. NATO military specialists consider that the moment directly after landing offers particularly favorable conditions for destroying the airborne assault force. In the rear areas of an army group or the area of a theater of war there are plans to organize an airborne patrol system, a system of obstacles, dummy installations and structures. The security bodies will introduce special traffic procedures.

The journal ARMED FORCES INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, No 5, 1976, states: "During the preparations for an antitank [sic. probably enemy] airborne assault force, strikes will be made against the bases, airfields and other installations where the units which make up the force are located."

It is planned that for carrying out this task tactical aviation will be used up to a depth of 1,000 km, and up to 600 km medium-range missiles. It is also recommended that larger-yield atomic strikes be made.

After the giving of the alert "probable landing of airborne assault force," the commander of a field army or a commander of the territorial troops begins to assess the situation in order to determine the probable landing area and the assumed object to be attacked and taken. The troops in the area are put on full combat alert. The personnel takes up the previously assigned firing positions. It is recommended that units of the police and gendarmerie be employed for reinforcing the guarding subunits. Mobile operational groups are readied for operating in the threatened area.

With the appearance of enemy aircraft carrying the assault party and with the commencing of its unloading, fire is opened up with all available means. The artillery and mortars concentrate their fire in the area where the assault force is to unload, while the air force and air defense weapons concentrate on the aircraft covering the party from the air.

If the enemy succeeds in landing and airborne assault force in an area which is beyond the range of artillery, the artillery subunits quickly move to new firing positions which make it possible to fire on the party. For this purpose they plan to widely use fire support helicopters which have been assigned to destroy the airborne assault force.

The plan is to destroy a landed airborne assault force with defensive and offensive actions. Defense is resorted to when the enemy possesses superior men and equipment. The defenses are aimed at causing maximum enemy losses and limiting its freedom of maneuver. When a landed airborne assault force has limited capability, then an offense is employed. The advancing troops are given a specific and decisive objective: by fire and maneuvering to surround and destroy the men and equipment of the landed enemy.

As a rule, the men and equipment assigned to defend the installation conduct the defensive actions while the mobile operational groups, in cooperation with the air force and artillery, conduct the offensive ones. It is also considered that nuclear weapons can be used to more quickly destroy the landing force. In this situation it is recommended that effective measures be taken to defend friendly troops from atomic radiation. Nuclear strikes are made with larger-yield ammunition and delivery systems which ensure greater strike accuracy. In the combat to eliminate an airborne assault force, fire and air strikes are first made against the forward detachments of the assault force which are holding the area for its landing. For achieving this objective, it is recommended that speed and taking advantage of the initial disorganization of the forward detachments be used.

If the available men and equipment are insufficient to destroy the airborne assault force, then the mobile operational groups are employed. These are rapidly moved into the landing area of the airborne assault force and attack the enemy on the move. It is felt that energetic actions at the moment of landing a portion of the airborne assault force can force the enemy to abandon the landing of the entire party. An operational group would achieve a better result if it operated rapidly and decisively with tanks and its offensive be supported by artillery fire.

When an airborne assault force is successfully landed and concentrated in a certain area, the method of its destruction is determined depending upon its strength, the force and composition of friendly troops and the terrain conditions.

If the men and equipment of a landed airborne force have been organized for defense, the plans envisage the launching of a rapid attack. The attack is conducted concentrically, from several axes in the objective of dividing the enemy and destroying it piecemeal.

When offensive actions do not bring results, the friendly troops go over to the defensive in order to have an opportunity to bring up reserves as well as new men and equipment if necessary, in again organizing an offensive.

Prior to organizing a new offensive, the enemy is shelled by the artillery and attacked by aviation and it is prevented from organizing defenses or escaping from the encirclement.

If the enemy has landed a large force in the rear of an army group or deeper in the operational rear, its destruction is entrusted to the mobile operational groups and the air forces as well as with the assistance of other men and equipment brought in by air from other areas.

When a large landing force commences an offensive to carry out the task assigned it, the men and equipment with the mission of destroying this force are divided into the forces for conducting holding operations and forces for destroying the landing party.

The holding men and equipment endeavor to check the advance of the landing force, in conducting defensive operations along a series of sequential lines.

The destroying forces make surprise attacks against the flanks and rear of the landing force. The objective is to completely surround the enemy and after this destroy it. In this instance it is recommended that nuclear weapons be used.

On a level of a general program, the NATO armed forces each year conduct troop exercises at which they work through the questions of destroying enemy airborne assault forces.

Our probable enemies give a great importance to countering the airborne forces and feel that under present-day conditions they will be very frequently used on the tactical, operational or strategic scale.

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FRANCO-GERMAN PLANS FOR TANK DEVELOPMENT

Sofia ARMEYSKI PREGLED in Bulgarian No 4, 1981 pp 127-128

[Article written from foreign military information by Col A. Starkov]

[Text] As has been announced in the foreign press, the governments of France and West Germany have agreed to form two working bodies (a research and development committee headquartered in Paris and a contracting production committee in Hamburg) to provide overall leadership for the program relating to the joint development of the basic combat tank of the 1990's (it will be called, respectively, the Leopard-3 and the Napoleon-1).

As has been emphasized by foreign specialists, the preliminary joint development of this tank is to start in the second half of 1980 and will run until 1984. After 1984, France and West Germany will begin full-scale and development and testing of the experimental models. Series production is to begin at the start of the 1990's.

During the talks by the representatives of the two countries, the question was discussed of participation of other NATO member nations in the development of the tank. According to the data in the forein press, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium have shown great interest, but their participation will depend upon a preliminary assessment of the cost of the research the development program for creating the tank, upon their possible share in this work and upon the agreement of France and West Germany.

According to information in the magazine INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, the Bundeswehr needs 2,000 such tanks while the ground forces of France will need 800. With eventual deliveries to Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, 5,000 tanks will be needed for the ground forces of the five countries.

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U.S. MILITARY INFORMATION ROUND-UP

Sofia ARMEYSKI PREGLED in Bulgarian No 4, 1981 p 128

[Unattributed U.S. military information]

[Text] By the end of 1980 there are plans to have seven "Lafayette"-class missile submarines in commission in the Navy after reequipping for the Trident-1 ballistic missiles.

The Pentagon at present is capable, according to the assessment of the U.S. military-political leadership, in 2 weeks to ferry up to 25,000 troops with light weapons into the Persian Gulf area. Six months will be required to deliver 110,000 American servicemen with heavy weapons there.

It is planned to shift from the United States two armored divisions, three mechanized divisions, two infantry divisions and an airborne attack division, an armored cavalry regiment and an infantry brigade to reinforce the grouping of American ground forces in the European zone. The heavy equipment for the two divisions and the armored cavalry regiment is to be stored in West Germany.

During the 1981-1982 fiscal year, around 800 million dollars will be spent to purchase artillery weapons for the U.S. ground forces. There are plans to purchase 7,760 7.62-mm M240 machine guns, 1,200 XM242 25-mm automatic guns, 110 Divad self-propelled antiaircraft artillery mounts, 1,681 81-mm XM252 mortars and 243 155-mm M198 towed howitzers.

The American Army has around 11,000 medium tanks and 1,400 light tanks. Of this number, 3,000 medium tanks are located in the American ground forces in the European zone and at storage areas in West Germany. By 1987, the number of tanks in the American Army should increase by 4,800 units.

The American aviation has 750 aircraft and 8,300 helicopters of varying purpose.

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IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGICAL PURITY STRESSED

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 23 Apr 81 p 3

[Article by Ladislav Hrzal: "Against Revisionism and Opportunism"]

> [Text] The 60-year experience of our communist party is indivisibly linked with the struggle against opportunism, rightist revisionism, as well as leftist sectarianism. For the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia the struggle against revisionism and opportunism, and the constant striving toward a creative development of Marxism-Leninism, has been and will remain a fundamental element of the party's political and ideological line. THis struggle embodies one of the most important internal legalities of the birth, development, and future progress of the communist party. Its place is among the decisive preconditions for the victory of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism and communism.

The past 60-years offer convincing testimony that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has honorably fulfilled and continues to fulfill its historic mission in this respect as well. The activities Report of the 16th CPCZ Congress noted that the history of our party reflects a great struggle for the creative mastering and application of Marxist-Leninist ideas under the concrete conditions of our country. It was often necessary to resist various manifestations of revisionism, rightist opportunism, as well as sectarianism. Each weakening and disruption of Leninist principles, tested by life itself, has always brought us heavy losses and damage while, on the other hand, consistent creative application of Marxist-Leninist experiences from the building of socialism, above all the experiences of the CPSU, became the source of our successes. These experiences have been helping us from the moment our party was born, to overcome obstacles, defeat ideological opponents and strengthen our ties with the working people to lead them finally to victory.

The theoretical and methodological foundations of the struggle against revisionism l e in the ideological heritage of Marxism-Leninsim and in the experiences of the CPSU which constitute a single entity reflecting the most important legalities of the struggle against revisionism and the road to its defeat. V.I. Lenin was the first Marxist in the international workers movement who, based on an analysis of the experiences of K. Marx and F. Engels in their struggle against opportunists, unmasked the social, economic, and ideological content of revisionism, and

clarified its function and historical role in the class struggle of the proletariat with imperialism. He defined the sources, substance and forms of this or that deviation from Marxism and from the class revolutionary policy of the working class. He pointed out the class and economic foundations of opportunism, reformism, and revisionism, their similarities and differences, as well as their dependence on concrete historical conditions of the development and status of the workers movement.

Lenin showed the way to cleanse the proletarian movement and its Marxist parties of opportunism and revisionism, and he did this at a time when many proponents of Marxism still did not understand what danger opportunism and revisionism represented for the workers movement. It is well known that certain ideologues of the Second International acted in a conciliatory manner toward revisionism and did not consider it an important antagonist. This was also reflected in our own workers movement.

Social democracy and its leaders were under the influence of the opportunists of the Second International, and even when the communists--following the establishment of the communist party in 1921--openly parted with reformist ideology, they were unable to get out from under its influence immediately. The process of bolshevization was one of creative mastering and application of CPSU experiences, the Leninist party of a new type. It was a fierce struggle with representatives of rightist opportunism, as well as various leftist deviations, a struggle which culminated at the Fifth CPCZ Congress with the victory of Klement Gottwald, and defeat of the opportunist leadership of Jilek.

Throughout this period, V.I. Lenin often personally assisted our comrades to settle accounts with both the rightist opportunists and the leftist deviationists. He urged communists to put a definite end to the remnants of social democratism which were reflected especially in underestimating the ideological education of party members, in failing to understand what revolutionary theory means for the workers movement and inability to fathom the fact that the role of the avant-garde can only be assumed by a party which is governed by the most progressive theory, a party which educates the popular masses and learns from them. This was also very important because our communist party was one of the largest, and in the links between the party and the people, the strengthening of an alliance with working peasants, the correct Marxist resolution of the nationalities problem, in all this we still had to overcome the old, opportunist social democratic thinking.

Important concrete assistance was provided by the Communist International which on several occasions dealt with the situation in our party and our struggle against opportunism and leftism, and decreed that all its sections master that which in Russian Bolshevism was and continued to be generally and internationally valid. How our party gradually dealt with rightist opportunism, how--especially after the Fifth CPCZ Congress--it creatively mastered Marxism-Leninism, was reflected positively in the strike movement and class struggle during the depression, as well as in creative application of the line set forth by the seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935. Our communist party stood for defending Czechoslovakia against Hitler and fascism. The struggle for a united people's front and the struggle for the defense of the republic

and democracy, clearly demonstrated that communists are consistent patriots, that they are the true defenders of progressive national traditions. The sacrifices communists have brought to the struggle against fascism for the sake of national liberation gained our party the confidence of all honest citizens of our state. The period from May 1945 to February 1948 showed that the communist party had learned a great deal in the struggle with ideological enemies and in the struggle for national liberation from fascism, that it had mastered the Leninist principles of the outgrowth of revolution, and that it had become the true leader of the people. The policy of peaceful development of the revolution toward the transition of the national and democratic revolution into a socialist one, provided convincing proof of the creative application of CPSU experiences in the concrete historical conditions of our country. The Kosice Government Program already represented the creative application of Leninist thought on how the proletariat should proceed in a democratic revolution so that this could grow into a socialist one. Our party based its actions on its own experience from the period 1918-20, as well as on the experiences of three Russian revolutions. When Klement Gottwald explained the party line, he emphasized at that particular state "our program is a national one. The fulfillment of the national program is the prerequisite for the fulfillment of socialist objectives."

Our party leadership fully respected the specificity of national Czechoslovak conditions. The Victorious February 1948 rebutted revisionist theories that the "Russian example" was applicalbe only for backward agrarian countries. The Czechoslovak experience confirms the universal validity of the dictatorship of the proletariat in an industrially developed country with bourgeois democratic and humanist traditions, in which real power of the workers was installed. It was installed by peaceful means in the spirit of what Comrade Klement Gottwald said at the Old Town Square on 21 February 1948: "We wish to resolve this crisis in a constitutional, democratic, and parlamentary manner on the basis of a broad National Front which represents all strata of the working people in the cities, as well as in the countryside." Internal conditions, especially the unity of the party and people, and external conditions of alliance with the Soviet Union, frustrated the plans of the reactionaries and accelerated the defeat of the bourgeoisie in our country. Thus spoke Comrade Gustav Husak at the 16th CPCZ Congress. He went on: "By carrying through a national democratic and socialist revolution, as well as by virtue of building socialism, we have through our labors enriched revolutionary theory and practical application. We, of course, recognize that the cause of socialism cannot be understood in a narrow, national framework. We are proud to be a part of the great family of the international revolutionary movement. Everything we do for the welfare of our people and our homeland, is also closely linked with the source of international responsibility."

Experience has shown that the working class can wrest power from the bourgeoisie and build a socialist society only in a sharp ideological struggle with the bourgeoisie and its allies, and with revisionists of various shades. Only when dogmatism and subjectivism are overcome, Marxist-Leninist theory creatively developed and the international experiences of the entire workers movement applied, can success be assured. History also confirms that whenever ideological work is underestimated, the struggle against bourgeois ideology eased, or wherever there is merely dogmatic parroting of Marxist-Leninist teaching without a correct

grasp of its meaning and substance, socialism becomes threatened, the party alienates itself from the people, it ceases to be the avant-garde of the working class, it becomes incapable of interpreting new events and of setting forth the correct line for the work ahead.

In the 1960's, there occurred in our country a gradual weakening of the leading role of the party in the building and development of a socialist society and in the application of Leninist principles of democratic centralism. The ties between the party and the people were disrupted, the leading role of the party and the people were disrupted, the leading role of the party was weakened in state bodies and management structures of the national economy, in its political influence on the work of social organizations and on the entire National Front. There were disruptions in the economy which itself should be the mirror of policy. All this undermined the foundations of a new revolutionary and societal quality, the foundations of a socialist society, the ideological and political unity of society, unity of the party and the people. Disrespect for the denial of Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism created conditions for the application of world imperialist strategy. Imperialism has focused--and is still focusing, as is obvious from the events in Poland--on internal erosion of the socialist community, and on erosion of socialism within the individual socialist countries. All this provided operating space for anti-Sovietism, nationalism, and anticommunism, opened the door to counterrevolution under the slogan "socialism with a human face." In reality, the aim was a return to the period before February 1948--and as openly admitted by certain ideologues of the counterrevolution--a return to pre-1945 conditions.

The documents "Lessons from the Crisis Period in the Party and Society after the 13th CPCZ Congress," and the "Resolution on Timely Problems of Party Unity," both of which were ratified by the 14th CPCZ Congress, express the principled, scientific approach of our communist party and its leadership to overcoming the crisis and resolving serious social problems. In organic unity, both documents became a reliable, binding, and forever valid directive in the struggle with revisionism and opportunism toward a creative application of the leading role of the party in our socialist society, raising the effectiveness of political, organizational, and ideological education in the party, improvement in all party functions, its strengthening, and a close relationship with the working masses.

The past decade, marked with the selfless endeavor of the party, the working class, cooperative farmers, and working intelligentsia, attests to the fact that successful development of a socialist society is conditioned on firm political leadership. In the process of consolidation, the CPCZ waged a decisive and complicated struggle for the renewal of the ideological and organizational unity of the party and its leading role in society. Experiences of our party from its struggle against rightist opportunism and revisionism for the restoration of Leninist standards of party life, show how important it is to maintain ideological and political unity of the party, to be concerned about purity of party ranks, to intensify party ties with the people, and to struggle each and every day against all manifestations of hostile and revisionist ideology, never let up in the struggle for the party's unity with the people, to set forth demanding, scientifically-justified and realistic tasks, and to consistently

control implementation of assigned bojectivea. Our experiences from the struggle against opportunism and revisionism, against anti-socialism and anti-Sovietism, also have a broader meaning and validity. This was demonstrated by the words of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev at the 16th CPCZ Congress when he said: "The victory over the counterrevolution in 1968 and the ability to draw profound political conlusions of long-term significance from the events of that period--that too is an important contribution of Czechoslovak communists to the development of the global revolutionary process. THis was a meritorious act appreciated by all the fraternal parties. Briefly stated, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has overcome with honor great difficulties and trials. It has always carried high the banner of Marxism-Leninism."

The results which our party and society have achieved since the 14th CPCZ Congress, confirm the conceptual and purposeful nature of the work of the CPCZ Central Committee, and the enormous political and organizational effort of the party as a whole. The party was strengthened, it improved its ideological and political action capability, and gained in authority among the broad masses of the working people at home, as well as in the international workers and communist movement. At the same time, however, we are aware that the new nature and complexity of tasks in building an advanced socialist society, and the problems which--as was shown at the 16th CPCZ Congress--emanate from this complexity, obligate our party to intensify in all spheres of activity its leading role, increase its implementation capability, and place new, higher demands on the ideological, political, and organizational unity of the party.

The struggle for socialist ideological involvement of the working people includes a daily struggle with bourgeois ideology, opportunism and revisionism. In this respect, we consider valid the experiences formulated on the subject of this struggle in the "Lessons" and further elaborated at party congresses and at individual sessions of the Central Committee. Revisionism and opportunism--as stated at the 15th session of the Central Committee in March 1980--are like weeds, even when you pull them out they have a tendency to grow back again in time. They are parasites feeding on shortcomings, mistakes, on problems which are not resolved promptely, on everything which is related to the natural risk of searching for the new. Their activity grows whenever the class struggle sharpens in the international context. The surest guarantee against the repeated appearance of revisionism and rightist opportunism, whatever form they might assume, is a creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory, its consistent application in practical experience, and a strengthening of the ideological and action unity of the party. The Lessons from Crisis Development, the importance of which was emphasized at the 14th and 15th congresses, is a lasting source of inspiration for our future endeavor, an example of creative application of Marxism-Leninism in our conditions.

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OUTLOOK FOR POLAND IF SOVIETS DO NOT INVADE

Rome LISTY in Czech No 2, Apr 81 pp 2-7

[Article by Zdenek Mlynar: "Polish Perspectives Without Invasion"]

[Text] It is quite understandable that when dealing with the Polish crisis, Western analysts focus especially on the question of whether there will be a Soviet intervention. Given the current international situation, such an intervention would in many respects be undesirable even for the political leadership in Moscow. One can therefore speculate whether Moscow will use this option, however, it would be hard to find anyone who would totally dismiss the possibility of such an act. There are too many historical precedents which speak for it.

Considerations of the possibility or probability of Soviet military intervention, however, should not preclude a more systematic examination of the other very important aspects of the current development in Poland. In this article, I would like to attempt an analysis of certain characteristics of the Polish crisis without regard to the problem of Soviet military intervention, more precisely, examine future development in Poland with the assumption that no such intervention will take place.

Certain analyses in Western publications give the impression that if Poland is allowed to handle its own affairs there would clearly be only one alternative, i.e., development toward a pluralist political democracy and independence of the social and political model of the Soviet type. I believe that the Polish perspective is not that simple, and therein partially lies the hope that there will be no Soviet military intervention. For if there should really occur in Poland a rejection of the social and political system of the Soviet type, then Moscow would certainly restore it by force.

At the same time, I am also convinced that Polish development without Soviet military intervention can bring about important changes in the Polish social and political system and--viewed in a long-term perspective--can also influence development in the other countries of the Soviet bloc. Realistically attainable changes, however, are limited.

Poland and Its Neighbors--Differences and Agreement

The social and political system of the Soviet type as it really existed in Poland long before the current crisis has had certain specific features in comparison with the other countries of the Soviet bloc. These differences have historical causes which are beyond the scope of this article. Among the most obvious are those often mentioned in Western publications, i.e., extensive private agriculture broader trade relations with the West, the great ideological and political influence of the Catholic Church, and less severe suppression of regime critics.

These differences are sometimes even considered as the source of a more liberal and democratic development than that which can be expected, for example, in the USSR, in contemporary Czechoslovakia, or the GDR. This positive assessment of certain specific characteristics of the social and political system in Poland undoubtedly contributed to the fact that the Gierek regime was treated with great indulgence in the West where information media had certainly not prepared their readers for the reality that it would be precisely in Poland where the regime would disintegrate under pressure of mass disaffection. A false illusion had been created that the regime in Poland was more stable than it really was. This stability was erroneously compared with Hungary since, under superficial examination, it appeared that the two regimes incorporated more "liberal" features than the other countries of the Soviet bloc.

In reality, however, what has distinguished the social and political system in Poland for several years was that it functioned even less well than those in the other countries of the Soviet bloc. The official structures in Poland have for a long time been able to achieve their own objectives to even a lesser extent than was the case in neighboring states, both in the economy and other spheres.

If we refrain from wishful thinking, we will find that even the frequently cited special characteristics of the social and political system in Poland are not always exclusively of a positive nature. The large private sector in agriculture is not only an expression of the state's limited power, but also one of the causes of the catastrophic state of the Polish national economy. Obviously, not because the farmers are private producers, but because under the existing system they are prevented from being as effective as they otherwise could be. On the one hand, the political rulers are unable to replace private farming with collectivization (not even of poor quality such as in the USSR) while, on the other, they are afraid to permit private farmers to function effectively, they make their situation difficult and constantly treat them as an "alien element." The result is worse stagnation of agricultural production than in the neighboring countries of the Soviet bloc.

Broader trade relations with the West are also deformed by existing realities in Poland. Its real ability to be economically effective on Western markets and to fit into the Western division of labor is as limited and unfavorable as is the case with its neighbors. The only thing that is greater in Poland is its indebtedness to the West. Given the magnitude of this debt, Poland's economy should be much more integrated with the West, whereas in reality its economy is fully integrated within CEMA. The result can only be factual inability to repay the Western loans and an overall drop in performance in the national economy--both again more pronounced than in neighboring states.

Even in the ideological and political spheres, some of the special Polish characteristics are a reflection of a state where the system is, above all, a system which does not function. The real sovereign position in this area is certainly not held by the communist party, but neither is it held by the Catholic Church, and even less by the groups of so-called dissidents, even though these have for years been more tolerated in Poland than in neighboring states. Since, however, the whole political system is not a pluralist one, but rather its functioning presupposes an autocratic sovereign in the ideological and political sphere, the result is a state in which the political system operate even less effectively than in the neighboring countries of the Soviet bloc. The conflict between the formal and informal structures in Poland is stronger than elsewhere, as is the loss of faith in the ability of the official structures to achieve their objectives, a distrust prevalent among both rulers and subjects. Corruption, cynicism, and apathy are much more likely the result of this state of affairs than the growth of liberal democratic value trends.

If we consider matters from this point of view, we see that the significance of the principal specific traits of the social and political system in Poland lies not in the opening of a concrete process toward greater democratization, but rather in less stability of the Soviet-type system. For a system which does not function is inevitably always an unstable one. From the vantage point of the Soviet bloc as a whole, the most important specific Polish characteristic has, under the circumstances, for several years been the fact that Poland represents the weakest link in the chain, about which Lenin said can affect the development of a whole chain of events and countries.

For this reason alone, the neighboring states of the Soviet bloc must be more concerned about the events than would seem necessary, given the basic differences between themselves and Poland. Even though in the GDR or in Czechoslovakia there is no threat of any of the specific Polish traits of development which we have just discussed, nevertheless, the malfunctioning and unstable system in Poland might threaten to expose the malfunction and instability of the neighbors' social and political systems as well.

In the respect, even without the Polish events, the 1980's did not begin propitiously in the Soviet bloc. All the bloc states officially announced that, according to plan, the growth of production and living standard would be limited to the minimum. In fact, maintenance of the living standard rather than its rise, became the official slogan. That in itslef closely reflected the entire mechanism which links political loyalty with material living standards. The fear that this mechanism would no longer be able to ensure stability, at least to the extent it had in the 1970's, had haunted the power elites in the Soviet bloc even before the events of the Polish Autumn.

The massive strikes in Poland, which not only forced the regime to recognize independent trade union organizations, but also brought down one leadership group and witnessed the intallation of another, presented a situation in which the power elites of the neighboring countries had to make sure, above all else, that they had the necessary tools to suppress similar tendencies in their own countries, and that they could isolate the Polish infection

at any price. It is without doubt that the call for military intervention, expressed openly in the Czechoslovak press and a bit more guardedly in the USSR and GDR, is directly related (and will remain so in the future) to this panicky reaction. Not in 1970, nor in 1976 were the power elites of the neighboring countries so terrified by developments in Poland, they did not then feel as vulnerable at home as they did in 1980. Moreover, the Polish regimes of those years managed to reduce tensions to much narrower perimters.

However if there is no Soviet intervention, the Polish example will not disappear from the earth. Power elites in all the countries under the Soviet system will be confronted with the need to resolve the problem of how to prevent a similar destabilization of the system at home. Poland will remain as indelible a reality as were the events following Stalin's death in the middle 1950's when the stabilization mechanism of mass political terror found itself in deep crisis.

This is not to say that the power elites in these countries will embark on a road of democratization, or that a new "liberalization" era is dawning. On the contrary, there is a real possibility that they will seek remedies in at least a partial return to the mechanism of political terror. Nevertheless, in the conditions of the 1980's, these power elites will eventually have to find ways of resolving the problem of stabilizing their own social and political systems. Therefore, the likelihood of a certain movement in these systems, characterized during the past decade by extraordinary stagnation and immobility, is—in light of the Polish example--quite real, in fact, necessary. It is certain that the focus of this movement will be influenced not only by internal factors in the countries of the Soviet bloc, but also by the international situation which,to some extent at least, also appears to contain new and as yet not quite clear elements.

It is, therefore, impossible within the scope of this article to attempt an assessment of even the principal characteristics and direction of such a movement in the Soviet system.

Pressures from "Below" and Limits of Systemic Changes in Poland

Unlike the "Prague Spring" of 1968 which began as a reform from "above" at the initiative of reformist currents within the official power structure, the way to the current development in Poland was opened exclusively through pressures from "below," through the initiative of social forces standing outside the official power structure. In practical terms, this demonstrated that the method by which the social and political systems of the Soviet type had been stabilized in the 1970's--which consisted of forcing all critical, reformist, and opposition elements outside of the ruling party and the official ruling structures--can have only limited temporary success. In this sense, thedevelopment in Poland since the fall of 1980, proved that the political orientation embarked on in the 1970's by the critical and opposition currents most vigorously especially in Poland, was correct. This orientation, first formulated years ago by Adam Michnik and applied in practice by the group known as KOR, correctly assumed that, following the defeat of the reformist currents within the communist parties of the Soviet bloc, the only realistic option for future development was pressure from below, organized outside of the party and official political structures.

Poland was the only country in the Soviet bloc where during the 1970's the political viability of such pressures was twice confirmed by practical experience--in December 1970 and in the summer of 1976. This provided the critical and opposition social forces with the needed self-confidence which is lacking in theother Soviet bloc countries (especially in Czechoslovakia since 1968). Demands for the formation and activity of institutions independent of the official structures were adopted not only by small groups of intellectuals, but rather by the most important social forces in the country, i.e., workers in large industrial conglomerates and private farmers. The concrete embodiment of these demands are now the independent Solidarity unions—already legalized under pressure by the regime in plants and enterprises, while tolerated in semilegality in the countryside.

Thus there emerged a situation in which, while there is indeed a new labor union mobement, it is by far not the only thing which has changed. The new situation involves a question of principle, whether it is possible to institutionalize the political will of the social forces which either have no opportunity at all to defend their interests and needs within the official power structure, or at least cannot do so to their satisfaction. This is concretely reflected in a whole spectrum of demands presented by the independent unions. They range from classical labor and social problems to freedom of the press and religion, they encompass virtually all social strata and political groupings (e.g., the demand to free political prisoners, including representatives of openly nationalist and anti-Soviet organizations). Meanwhile, the official power structures appeared incapable of preventing the establishment and development of undesirable new institutions, since to attempt this would threaten open confrontatin with the strongest elements in Polish society.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the rulers in Poland and neighboring countries are extremely concerned about this state of affairs. Assessed from the point of view of thier official ideology, Marxism-Leninism, these rulers must recall Lenin's characterization of a revolutionary situation as one in which the rulers can no longer rule by available means, and the subjects are no longer willing to submit to these means. The current situation in Poland truly contains the first germs of a revolutionary situation as depicted by Lenin.

What then would be the meaning in contemporary Poland of a social and political revolution, i.e., a state in which the existing social and political system would face eruptive disintegration and the real social and political forces in the country would openly formulate their demands and attempt to put them into practice? It would have to mean stripping the communist party of power and its disintegtation as an organization of the power elite (in the sense of a special social group). In the sphere of social and economic relations it would have to mean, on the one hand, new forms of collective ownership and, on the other, development of a strong private sector in agriculture, public services, and evidently even in a portion of industry. The strongest ideological orientation in contemporary Poland would most probably be a form of Christian socialism in the broadest ideological and political sense of the term, which would grow into social democratic reformism, concepts of self-management and, at the same time, a liberal interpretation of civil rights and freedoms. L. Kolakowski's formulation of conservative-liberal socialism, now regarded rather as a literary contribution, expresses such a situation quite precisely.

It is hardly conceivable that should such a social and political revolution really break out (much less should it succeed), Poland would remain "a firm link in the Warsaw Pact alliance," in the sense and extent expected as an essential precondition to "friendly relations" by the political leadership in Moscow. A fully sovereign, independent Polish national state which--were it really following the wishes of its citizens--would not remain a subordinate cog in the Soviet bloc, would be the logical result of such a revolution. While no one speaks of this openly today, it is not a false deduction.

At this point, we must ask a perfectly clear question, namely, does anyone today really desire such a social and political revolution with such obvious consequences to Poland? If we disregard small, extremist groups such as have always existed in every society, the answer is definitely in the negative. Not in Poland, nor on the current European and world political scene does one find a single relevant force which would consider such a development in Poland desirable.

In Poland itself, such a development along with its inevitable consequences is not desired by the official power structure, nor by the church, nor by the independent Solidarity unions, nor even by the critical and opposition groups with considerable influence such as, for example, KOR. Nor is there any social stratum in Polish society which would identify with such visions of future development. Not because the cited demands of a hypothetical revolution lack advocates, on the contrary, all these demands have them, and for this reason they are latently incorporated in the current Polish situation. Lacking are advocates of such demands who would simultaneously fail to recognize their unreality. There is indeed a clear awareness that to focus the future on such a social and political revolution would inevitably lead to the defeat of the entire movement and, rather than bring about improvement, would end in a national catastrophe for Poland.

With respect to the international political forces, the situation--while much more complex and controversial--does have a common denominator, i.e., none of the relevant political forces in contemporary Europe identifies its own interests with a revolutionary disintegration of the social and political system in Poland. It is impossible within the scope of this article to argue this thesis in more detail. It is,however, based largely on the reality that all political forces engaged in European politics prefer a political situation which is predictable rather than the opposite. A social and political revolution in Poland would inevitably create an unpredictable situation.

In theview of orthodox leftist ideologues one can, of course, brand such conclusions--with respect to both Poland and Europe as a whole--as regrettable. However, inasmuch as we are considering the threat of armed conflict in the atomic age, and as long as we differentiate between the logic of revolution and the logic of a hazardous gamble, we should view the present situation in Poland with hope for a realistically achievable gradual development of the social and political system in Poland and possibly, in long-range perspective, in the entire Soviet bloc.

The course of events in Poland to date justifies such a hope to a certain, albeit not too great degree. In the internal development in Poland from September of last year to January of this year, it was precisely the awareness

of the undesirability and unreality of a social and political revolution against the existing system, which provided the most important foundation of all the steps implemented thus far by both the official power structure and the critical and opposition forces. From the time of the strikes and the accompanying negotiations, through the adopted agreements between the government and the independent unions, all the way to the continuing struggle for implementation of the changes guaranteed by the agreements, it was primarily this awareness of the necessity to compromise which set the basic tone.

This process has been and continues to be accompanied by serious difficulties, as well as by the danger that at some future point a timely compromise acceptable to both sides would not be found. This situation places new and, at times, paradoxical demands on both sides of the conflict, namely, both the revolting opposition and the official political power structure are often forced to proceed in a manner contrary to the abstract logic of their own basic positions and customary methods of action.

For the opposition forces striving for systemic changes, the paradox l es in the fact that the greater their successes in the initial phases when the door to such changes was opened, the greater the need to change methods in the second phase when compromise is to be reached. Wihtout changes in methods and, to some extent, in final objectives, these forces risk failure in the second phase.

The is the key problem in the immediate future for the new political force in Poland, the independent Solidarity unions. Thier success was conditioned by the fact that they used the strikes (and threat of general strike) to force the rulers into basic concessions, i.e., legalization of the independent unions. This was precisely what opened the door to the possibility of systemic changes. Had the leadership of the striking workers hesitated on this basic question of legalization, had they accepted conditions which would in some way have delayed this decision to a time when a general strike might no longer have posed a threat to the rulers, it is doubtful that the road to systemic changes would have been opened.

At the same time, however, Solidarity's victory has since the very first phase been a certain form of compromise. It rested on the recognition by the independent unions of the so-called "leading role of the communist party in the state." Yet it was a compromise at a time when the only alternative would have been a social and political revolution. The agreement between the strikers and the government closed the door to this alternative. The compromise, however, does not preclude systemic changes in the sense that the independent unions, as part of the political system, have achieved a qualitatively different position than the previous trade union organization which was totally subordinated to the party and state apparat.

Yet it should be remembered that precisely because the independent unions had achieved important success in the first phase (recognition by the state of their existence), their own position has changed, they have become part of the political system and have ceased to be a force standing outside the official power structure. This naturally changed in certain respects--by no means in all--

their objectives, as well as the methods to be used to ahcieve them. In a certain sense, they have assumed the position of their original rival--the former official trade unions. This rival had disintegrated and ceased to be the principal partner of political power, while Solidarity assumed exactly this position.

In the second phase of development, when it is and will continue to be a question of gradually achieving additional systemic changes, the independent unions continue to function as a pressure group. However, they should not limit their activities to this as they did in the first phase when they were represented by the coordinating strike committee. Even the strike itself cannot in the future remain their only, and in many situations even the principal, method of achieving their objectives. Stated briefly, they represent a pressure group which shares responsibility for social and political decisions and development throughout the country, thus also for whether or not the economic, social, and political situation in the country requires, for example, a general strike as a form of pressure on state power.

Unless the leadership of the new unions (or at least its majority) and most of the members correctly understand this change in their own situation which emerged from their victory, even that which has already been achieved might be threatened in future phases of development. In practical terms, the conflicts in perception of the new situation are outwardly manifested as disagreement between the so-called radical and moderate approaches to a long list of problems. It is especially the question of whether the principal weapon--strikes and the general strike--should be used repeatedly, in other words, how frequently should and must it be used, and toward the achievement of what objectives. The charismatic leader of the workers, Lech Walesa, must himslef sense the troublesome features of this situation every time he is outvoted in the leadership group.

The forces of the formerly monolithic power structure, institutionally represented primarily by the communist party and the state apparatus (despite all internal differences in these institutions), are also confronted with a different, but for them euqally troublesome and paradoxical situation. The more they have given up in the first phase their old methods of pressuring society by forcibly imposing their will without regard to the wishes of the subjugates social forces, themore success they achieved in the compromise by managing to maintain themselves in the role of the opposition forces' partner. In the second phase, after a compromise has already been reached, they simply cannot continue to act in the same manner because they would be placing their role in jeopardy. They must necessarily become an active defender of those elements in the compromise which the opposition force had from the very beginning accepted with reluctance and under pressure of the situation.

The fundamental question is how and by means of what methods will it be possible in practical terms to safeguard the compromise in a situation which has all the characteristics of an incipient revolution. Unless the official power structures (or at least their majority) recognize that for them too a new situation has emerged in which they have maintained their position not as an absolute power center, but rather as one of two sides of a compromise, they too can in the future place in jeopardy that which they had achieved in the

first phase. Conflicst regarding this basic premise which occur regularly in connection with practical solutions for a whole range of concrete problems, will be reflected as disagreements between the reformist and conservative forces within the official power structures. It is mainly a question of whether the power structures will recognize that it is the achieved compromise which provides a foundation for future development, rather than a false state of stability without internal dynamism, without any hope of systemic changes. What is needed is recognition that forcible imposition of their will without regard to the will of the governed social forces, is henceforth not feasible as the principal method of governing in a system which had ceased to function precisely as a result of this method.

The official power structure and its representatives headed by Stanislaw Kania are--unlike the opposition forces—directly and heavily dependent nto only on the reaction of the internal social forces in Poland, but also, and often principally, on the reaction of the power center in Moscow. Their position is, therefore, certainly more complex than that of the opposition; however, this is an inevitable consequence of the fact that they are the official power elite and thus bear direct responsibility for all of Poland's past development and its present state.

The basic problem in contemporary Poland can, therefore, be expressed as follows: it is a question of whether it is possible to establish on a long-term basis an institutional system capable of recognizing that social and political problems even in the system of "real socialism" are a normal and permanent phenomenon, a system capable fo resolving these problems repeatedly by new agreements and compromises between the center of power and the governed, rather than by repression, on the one hand, or an attempt to remove the problems by social and political revolution, on the other.

The condition for such a solution is to prevent eruption and disintegration of the existing social and political structures, as well as a return to the status which existed before the fall of 1980 (by Soviet military intervention, but possibly through mobilization of the internal repressive apparat).

What concrete institutional forms and what concrete forms and methods of political life would be applied, is impossible to predict and assess, not even using the example of pluralist political democracy in other countries, nor through the abstract logic of the Soviet model of a political system. It is to be expected that both would in this case be represented, as well as suppressed in the form of a compromise which would create concrete relationships between the social forces and the power structures as they both exist exclusively in contemporary Poland. There are many historically specific elements in Poland which it is impossible to analyze within the scope of this article.

Let me say, however, that one of these factors is the Catholic Church. It has the special position of an institution with enormous ideological and political influence in society, while remaining to a large extent independent of the current forms of conflict between state power and the social forces of workers and peasants. Both sides of the conflict therefore seek some degree of support from the church, thus lending it the role of compromise mediator, albeit one with limited possibilities. The fact that the church's own special interests

are not identical either with those of the power center or those of the opposition forces, permits the church to a make a real contribution to the search for compromise. The fact that Marx must be turning in his grave and Lenin in his mausoleum, has no real significance under "real socialism," since it is certainly not the first time, nor probably the last.

If the development embarked on in Poland is not forcibly suppressed, there is hope for something new within the social and political systems of the Soviet bloc. The state system which could be accomplished in Poland would be different from the visions of the CPCZ reformers in 1968. They attempted to introduce, according to ideologically motivated programs, a sort of optimal social and political system which would combine social structures of the Soviet type with those of the pluralist type. To a great extent, these programs were dominated by the idea of harmony between those governed and an enlightened "scientifically performing" political power center. In Poland, there is a certain hope for the emergence of a social and political system which would create opportunities for new compromises and resolution of permanent conflicts between the governed and the power center. An idea not so much prompted by a "human face," but perhaps that much more realistic.

Poland would not simply become a kind of second Hungary. Briefly stated, Hungary is ruled by a social and political system which, though based on the Soviet model, rather successfully conducts politics as the art of the possible in the sense that it nips in the bud any social or political conflicts and, mindful of its own 1956 experience (and 1968 in neighboring Czechoslovakia), keeps any latent opposition in the belief that any more is realistically out of the question. In long-term perspective, however, this is more a recipe for a bearable existence of people in a blind alley, than a plan of how to open the doors to the internal dynamism of the system. Today's Poland, on the other hand, offers hope--not too great, as already stated--because the door has already been partially opened to internal dynamism, even though this process is accompanied by difficulties, new compromises, and a looming threat.

If the attempt succeeds, Polish development could mean the beginning of a new developmental phase in social and political systems, the beginning of the end of the Brezhnev era of relative stability of a still totalitarian system of Stalinist provenance. It is for this reason that Poland is facing and will continue to face a threat that, even if internal conflicts are handled in the desirable manner described in this article, there might be a lethal strike initiated by forces outside of the Polish borders.

Finally, there remains one other alternative--not very probably but nonetheless possible. We cannot totally discount the possibility that--as was the case following the fall of Gomulka in 1970--development could be turned back by means of the wrong kind of compromise. This would, of course, mean a very temporary stabilization at the end of which would, most probably, appear the uncontrollable eruption of the social and political system.

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CZECHOSLOVAK WORKERS: NO SUPPORT FOR POLAND

Rome LISTY in Czech No 2, Apr 81 pp 20, 21

[Article by "YPSILON": "Why We Are Unable to Contribute"]

[Text] We can pat ourselves on the back with a feeling that we are all great fellows. We at home because we have published God only knows how many editions, petitions, expenditions, spectrums, squares, C harter bulletins, VONS reports, etc., etc., and you abroad who have a representative in the European Parliament, LISTY, Safron and Palach Press, INDEX in Cologne, Skvorecky in Toronto, and Lord knows what else.

Then LISTY No 5 reaches Prague with a serious article on the Polish Summer. This piece poses an urgent question, namely, will they again struggle alone? And we can only reply truthfully that, yes, the Poles will again struggle alone--certainly and without doubt. They cannot expect from Czechoslovakia any help worth mentioning. Obvious sympathy and one or two proclamations of s lidarity will change nothing in this fact. Whoever hopes for or expects r mething else is engaging in wishful thinking and self-deception.

Before we examine why this is so, let us take another look at the LISTY article "Alone Once Again," more precisely, two pieces of advice and recipes which our colleagues abroad are offering. It is always unpopular and depressing to note that there is an intellectual chasm, that our colleagues abroad suffer from insufficient comprehension of the situation and conditions in which the internal opposition lives. This is an unavoidable disease of every emigration wave, recurring again and again. Assuming that the disease can be cured at all, then perhaps it must be done through regular shocks. So, please, excuse us if it hurts.

The first bit of advice in the LISTY article goes as follows: "We will prevent any kind of participation by the Czechoslovak army or security forces in any possible Warsaw Pact intervention in Poland." Such advice should not be "committed" by professional politicians, for it obviously evokes the question of how to go about it. Perhaps as follows: a delegation of the Charter appears at the Defense Ministry and informs the minister that we are not going to Poland, period. A copy of this statement goes to the interior minister as Charter statement number so-and-so. Or another possibility: selected volunteers will lie down on the roads leading to border corssing points and thus stop the advance of the tanks. Or thirdly: we will massively propagate the song "I am not going

to Poland," to be sung by all armored vehicle gunners the moment they receive their orders to move out. This will complete our participation in the planned intervention and the soldiers will break ranks and go to have a beer. There were times when Czech regiments marched to the front to the sounds of the regimental band. There were also times when a young communist, Stanislav Budin, shouted at the swearing in ceremony "Not Masaryk, but Lenin," and consequently risked about 2 months in the brig. As long as LISTY lives in the illusion that such times still exist here, they don't need to worry, not one Czech foot will enter Poland.

Let us take the other piece of advice, since it is far more symptomatic: "While our economic situation is b tter than in Poland, our workers are tired and indignant because of the worsening supply system, and work conditions..." This sounds like something out of the higher school of journalism, i.e., how to write without knowing what one is writing about. Had it been otherwise, the writer's pen would have been slowed by the fact that there is a difference in the disaffection of a workers slaving 6 days a week with hunger staring him in the face, and a worker getting by 5 days at work with the vision of a weekend which begins Friday afternoon when he loads his MB or LADA car with beer, cutlets, and the family. He spends the weekend at his cottage and feels that "the whole system can go to hell." Disaffection exists, yes, of various degrees, for example, our lucky worker had to offer a bribe to get his 20 bottles of beer which would otherwise be unavailable, he besieges the shops where, while there is nothing he really needs, one always finds something, and once in a while, the Lord or another saintly being willing, he might even find a collapsible bicycle, a washing machine, or a bath towel. While gasoline is expensive, in fact hellishly so, one always makes it as far as the cottage, and one makes out once a year for a vacation. Somehow there is still enough money and one can always spend it on food. We gobble food like Czechs and guzzle alcohol like Slovaks. A full stomach is the instrument on which the establishment plays a lullaby with virtuosity, using a bow made from ignoring "normal" theft and failure to maintain labor discipline, and of tolerance toward the second economic system. In comparison with his Polish counterpart, the Czech worker still has a lot to lose. The cadaverious unions, demeaning act of voting, the nonsense of aping the Soviets at every turn, are mere bedbugs which annoy and itch but with which one can live. If the hit of the Polish Christmas was a small cube of butter, the hit of ours was a collapsible bicycle. There is an utter lack of evidence that the working class ever rose because of a shortage of collapsible bicycles.

That is the situation today and everything else is untrue. We know, however, that tomorrow or the day after, the situation will be different. The current latent economic crisis here will turn into an acute one. This is as certain as today's full stomachs. When the Czech worker no longer has anything to lose, will he produce from among his ranks his own Walesa? We believe he will, but a childlike faith in historical momentum is all we have to prove it, since we have as yet done absolutely nothing toward this goal. We dissidents, we the socialist opposition, we the excommunicated ones, have done nothing to prepare for a Czech Walesa, even though we had all the tools, ability, opportunity, as well as time. We have filled tons of paper with elegant feuilletons, sociological analyses, essays on small, everyday, unspectacular work, we have sacks full of VONS reports and miles of protest signatures. The result can only be considered pathetic. The Czech working class is totally unaffected

by dissident activities. If they know something about it at all, it comes most probably from official information media. May the Lord bless them! Herein LISTY hits the nail on the head, albeit rather chastely and shyly: "What we lack is 3 or 4 years of KOR-type activity...we devote too much attention to individual cases of repression." Calling a spade a spade, this means that we lack a committee for the defense of workers, while VONS operations are sometimes reminiscent of a mill which runs but does not grind. It is less important that the mill runs than what is produces. Let us, however, return to the gist of the problem of why our workers are unaffected by dissidence.

Tens of thousands of us have in the early 1970's been moved into the sphere of manual labor. We went there with an aura which we had awarded ourselves, an aura of the proud losers of 1968. It soon became obvious that such credentials meant nothing in the new surroundings. We underestimated the fact--or rather failed to recognize it at all--that the 1968 conflict was not a visceral conflict of the working class. We had lost virtually everything, while the workers lost little, if anything at all, when seen through a short-term perspective. The standard of living unquestionably rose by the middle 1970's and, whether we like it or not, this makes a potent argument. Personal and cultural freedom, a sense of national humiliation, all that is also known "down there below," but in good economic times, these terms recede into the background. Then came the Charter and, with the advent of the second half of the 1970's, the first tangible sings of economic difficulties. What did we do?

A decade ago, tens of thousands of us picked up the shovel. Has anyone ever given thought to how many of us actually remained in manual labor? It would provide surprising data for sociologist to see how many full, partial, old-age, and disabled retirees suddenly appeared in our ranks, how many "free-lancers" and other, often obscure, means of livelihood removed our people from the factories where the new masters improvidently placed us somewhat like lice in a fur coat? Or could those in power have known what they were doing? Did they realize what our presence there would mean? The brewer in Havel's play "Audience" tells the excommunicated individual: "Whatever you do, you will always be a famous writer, while I will always remain an insignificant, 'what's-his-name' brewer." Perhaps we should be concerned because the brewer is certainly not the only one who feels that way.

Let us continue though: Which one of us who actually stayed with the "spade," honestly experiences and understands the problems of his fellow workers? Are we not tempted to put in our 8-1/2 hours, take off the coveralls, have a shower and, at least after work and over weekends, again become the professor, engineer, editor, or three-times doctor, even though we realize we are only pretending? Let us confess, we much prefer to write a brilliant feuilleton than sit down after work with a glass of rum and beer for chaser to jaw with our coworkers, a feuilleton perhaps on why we have to go through so much red tape and harassment to make such that we receive our pay envelope in good order. It is more elegant to address the fugue of our rhetoric to "deaf organs and institutions" from time to time, than to try to convince party members over that glass of rum that, for example, the Poles are not a bunch of lazy bums who we have to feed. No one is overly touched or impressed by the fact that someone used to be a professor, engineer, editor, or three-times doctor. The worker's ears, however, are not deaf, but they only respond to those who have earned their respect and whose authority was established at the work site.

And which one of us has gained such authority and how? By describing the humiliation of being forced into unskilled labor? Or did perhaps the "underground" achieve such authority by its songs, such as "I don't want to waste my time at the lathe, I don't want to learn your swinish ways, you can kiss my rear?" Well, the worker has to stand by the lathe and he does not waste his time there, moreover, he knows all about the swinish ways of the system. To remain a working cog in the machinery is, if you'll excuse me, his bread and butter. Have those of us who--through muddying the waters and bombastic gestures--are preparing for their life abroad, done anything to contribute to the search for a future Czech Walesa? Speaking of emigration, almost nothing harms our credibility "down there below" as much as the ease with which many of us are resolving our problems by going abroad.

We meet on Tuesdays, we meet regularly and we discuss many things. I doubt that anyone hears about these sessions except, of course, the security organs. Perhaps, on that little acre of ours, in the future there will also blossom meetings on Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays. A zero can be multiplied, added to, divided, and the result is still the same.

In closing, the Charter and its adopted offspring, VONS" these are brave and selfless people, self-sacrificing to the point of self-destruction, who invest all their moral and physical energy in a game not unlike blindman's buff. It is not my intention to belittle all that VONS has accomplished. To monitor individual cases of repression and thus make sure that they not remain anonymous and forgotten, certainly constitutes a worthy cause. After all, it is through VONS that we find out about a "salvadorization" of the regime, i.e., of the growing number of cases of physical violence against different thinking individuals. If, however, this is all we can and should expect of this virtually only activist opposition group, it is too little, and what's more, the expended assets and effort outweight the results. This is by no means the fault of the young people who had barely acquired a taste of politics in 1968-69 and matured in the "goulash" odor of the normalization reality. They are the activists of today because that is what they want to be, because they cannot do otherwise--and I dare a whole herd of skeptics to sneer at the nobility of this assertion. Unfortunately, left to their own resources, they do what they do, no more, no less. They were abandoned by all of us and there is no way we can escape this responsibility or find excuses for it. They were abandoned by us, let us say, older, more experienced, and politically more astute individuals. And, abofe all else, where are the former political leaders who once held important positions in official and unofficial social structures? Where are their names, their contacts, their experience, their--perhaps not altogether forgotten--credibility abroad? Indeed, the VONS young people represent the capital, the investment with which one could penetrate the consciousness of a broader segment of the public, influence it and anchor our activity within it. These young people are our chance to break that vicious circle of the quasi petty-bourgeois conditions so typical for the current state of the internal opposition movement.

Christmas 1980

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DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER URGES MEDIA SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE EFFORT

East Berlin NEUE DEUTSCHE PRESSE in German Vol 35 No 2, Feb 81 signed to press 9 Jan 81 pp 6-7

[Interview with Col Gen Heinz Kessler, deputy minister for national defense; chief, Political Main Administration, National People's Army (NVA); by NEUE DEUTSCHE PRESSE: "Socialist Military Policy--Topic of Our Mass Media"]

[Text] [Question] Comrade Colonel General! The meeting of leading representatives of the participating states of the Warsaw Pact on 5 December, 1980 in Moscow and the 13th meeting of the SED Central Committee consider that the international situation requires an increased vigilance against the aggressive aspirations of the imperialist forces. What military political tasks result therefrom for journalists of the GDR?

[Answer] As in the past, also in the future in the profession of military journalism it will be important to proceed from the fact that the military defense of the achievements of socialism is an indispensable task for the states of the socialist community. It is supported in all areas of the socialist society, and it is guaranteed by strong, up-to-date armies, which represent the core of national defense and are solidly linked together in the Joint Armed Forces of the states of the Warsaw Pact. In this connection the Soviet Army is the main force in our military coalition.

In view of the rapidly accelerating imperialistic arms race and the increasing dangers for peace resulting from the NATO war course, it is necessary to increase the combat readiness of our armed forces and not to allow NATO to attain its goal of changing the strategic military relation of forces in its favor.

It should be a basic concern of every editorial staff to make clear to all GDR citizens the dialetical unity of securing the peace and strengthening socialist home defense. It is imperative to report continually on the many-layered activities in this area, to impart experiences and provide suggestions how the citizens, especially young persons, can support the GDR defense preparedness.

We consider as especially important contributions to the socialist defense incentive, to the NVA class mission, its unity with the people of the GDR and its internationalistic position, to the military career trainees, to the responsible assignments of the Border Troops and the GDR civil defense, as well as to the

premilitary training of the Society for Sport and Technology. Certainly such projects are not just a matter for military editors, but a job for all departments in the editorial staffs of our mass media.

[Question] In a few weeks, on 1 March, we will celebrate the 25th anniversary of the NVA. Would you express a few thoughts concerning the preparation for this anniversary?

[Answer] The 25th anniversary of the NVA is an outstanding military political highlight in the present stage of preparation for the 10th SED Congress. Every GDR citizen can rightfully be very proud that the working class and all workers in a quarter century under the leadership of the SED have shown that they are capable of successfully solving the military question in the course of the socialist revolution. For the first time in German history regular armed forces were organized that are a true people's army The NVA in its totality deservedly joins the historical achievements of the worker-and-peasant-state. In a number of crucial tests the members of the GDR armed forces have shown their unconditional loyalty to the SED, the leading force in our socialist society. They have also shown their active internationalism, their truly patriotic attitude and their continually growing military skill.

Thanks especially to the help and support of the Soviet Army and the soviet naval war fleet we have modernly equipped and trained land and air defense forces as well as naval forces ready and able to complete combat assignments under all conditions and to fight victoriously at the side of the comrades-in-arms. Thus we will do justice to that requirement which V.I. Lenin clothed in words, to the effect that a revolution is only worthwhile when it is able to protect itself.

[Question] You mentioned the internationalistic position of the NVA. What possibilities do you see of developing even better the concept of comradeship-in-arms in publications?

[Answer] Comradeship-in-arms between the socialist armies is and remains a central theme. It is one of the great accomplishments of the policy and military policy in our alliance. At this point I should like to praise the outstanding work of GDR journalists, which was performed in connection with the "Comradeship-in-Arms 80" maneuver, the most important military political event in preparation for the 10th SED Congress. It is necessary to proceed with the experience thereby gained. It would be desirable in this regard to describe in even greater detail the comradesip-in-arms in the soldier's daily routine, with information, for example, about military performance comparisons between units of the Soviet Armed Forces group in Germany and the NVA, about mutual political, cultural and sporting events, soldier encounters, and exchanges of experiences by the commanders and political organs.

In this connection Comradeship-in-Arms Week in February is naturally a special occasion, but it alone is by no means sufficient for continuous reporting. Also valuable in helping the comrades-in-arms to get to know one another are publications on the history of the fraternal armies, their traditions and in general about life in the Warsaw Pact countries.

[Question] The lie about the threat from the East is enjoying a boom in the imperialistic press. What thoughts do you have concerning the use of journalistic means to unmask the demagogy of the class enemy?

[Answer] The altercation with imperialist military policy and their ideological cloak is indeed more necessary than ever. A clear Marxist-Leninist assessment of the enemy has long been one of the preconditions for the successful defense of the socialist state's authority, the greatest achievement of the socialist revolution.

NATO's material preparation for war is being accompanied by an excessively intensive anti-Soviet and antisocialist agitation and slander, by an ideological war on a new scale. The goal is to get the people in the NATO countries to accept the arms race and aggressive actions, to cause confusion within our ranks, and to call forth and when possible to manipulate counterrevolutionary activities, such as is being practiced, for example, against the People's Republic of Poland.

The important thing is to expose the aggressive imperialist forces in the United States, the FRG and in other NATO countries, as well as the adherents of hegemony in Peking as the cause of the aggravation in the world situation. The Soviet Union and her sister states threaten no one. They do not strive for military superiority. The main imperialist powers, especially the United States, are the initiators of qualitative and quantitative arming. This is demonstrated in our press by a number of facts. It would be good and correct to comment on these facts in greater detail and thus more solidly illustrate to those persons not versed in military science the background and correlations of imperialist military policy and the conclusions for the struggle against the NATO war course.

[Question] Editorial staffs and journalists can appreciate the cooperation with the National Defense Ministry. In view of the standards relative to the editorial staffs set forth by you what form will support take in the future?

[Answer] At the "Comradeship-in-Arms 80" maneuver new standards were also established for the cooperation between the army and the mass media. This successful teamwork of our ministry with the editorial staffs and the transmission channels will be continued during the year of the 10th SED Congress.

Having comrades of the army leadership, generals, admirals and officers regularly write about problems of military policy in our newspapers or appear on radio or television programs has proven itself. We will methodically continue that in 1981 also. The press section of our ministry also foresees many press discussions, excursions and other information to support and substantially orient journalists. Leading comrades in the NVA, the border troops and the GDR civil defense will answer for socialist military policy and national defense. Differentiated conceptual consultation with military political editors or the various media is to attain a greater importance in the responsible cooperation of our ministry with journalists.

In this regard we are most concerned with further qualifying the long-term work planning, with even more thoroughly helping to prepare the journalists for reporting assignments in troop sections and units, and with giving them opportunities to visit the troop and gather information for interesting reports, stories and portraits of the soldier's daily routine.

Of course we will continue to support the courses of instruction of the GDR German Journalists Association, especially the section for military policy, with qualified consultants.

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EMERGENCE OF INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION NOTED IN HUNGARY

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French May 81 p 4

[Article by Xavier Richet, University of Paris X; Center for International Economics of the Eastern Countries (CNRS) [National Center for Scientific Research]]

[Text] Might the socialist countries go through what the Poles are going through today? The events in Poland are being evaluated in various circles, either to deplore them and worry about them, or to rejoice in them and hope they will expand beyond that country's borders.

In Hungary the situation appears to be very clear. The Budapest government has not hesitated to raise the price of consumer goods and lower the buying power of the population, for the purpose of absorbing the deficit in the balance of trade. Similar measures lit the powder keg in Poland. But the Hungarian economy functions differently, with a partially decentralized management system; agrarian reform, early in the 1960s, contributed to stimulating agricultural production and increasing the role of private initiative. Administrative planning gave way to indirect regulation, resting on an incentive system (price policy, the role of profit, taxation, etc.).[1] Although this economy is not yet a model of market socialism, it nevertheless exhibits a greater flexibility; it is in a position to supply the population satisfactorily.

This liberal course has had positive results in many areas of intellectual life. Of course freedom of speech is not recognized; but it is undeniable that in particular sectors (except philosophy and sociology), intellectuals enjoy genuine autonomy. This is especially apparent in the economic discipline, for example, where several schools have opened up.[2]

In such circumstances it is difficult for a "Polish-type" opposition to emerge; the magnitude of the consensus created over many years around "Kadarism"[3] leaves a very narrow political margin for putting an opposition in place. In Poland and in Czechoslovakia the opposition groups have a definite political program: charter, human rights, political rights, etc. At the moment, in Hungary, the opposition is searching between two poles: renewal movement on the one hand, and political movement in the strict sense on the other.

This opposition is a recent phenomenon. At the beginning of the 1970s several intellectual groups got into trouble with the government. The "Budapest school,"[4] which included some disciples of the philosopher Lukacs, formulated criticism of the "goulash socialism" model that was then developing. But the questions raised were

more a matter of ethics than of basic criticism. The scattering, followed by the emigration, of its principal organizers, left the field free for a more radical opposition, confined exclusively to intellectual circles.

In 1973 Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis, two young sociologists were expelled from the party for having written, with the philosopher Gyorgy Markus--who is now a professor in an Australian university--a voluminous manuscript of over 1,000 pages devoted to a book critical of Marx' "Das Kapital." Their expulsion, followed by their being gradually frozen out (since 1973 they have lost their position as researchers and are living by translating) impelled them to go beyond simple intellectual criticism of the system. In this the progress of the Bence-Kis group follows that of their Polish friends in the KOR [Workers Self-Defense Committee] and differs from that adopted by Rudolf Bahro, who remains in purely theoretical and anti-revisionist problematics[5].

At the same time the proceeding took place against the sociologist Mr Haraszti, who had described in a work that became famous[6], the working conditions in a Hungarian steel plant. This case demonstrated the limits that were not to be crossed in the area of criticism. Afterwards, this nucleus of intellectuals was joined by many persons who had encountered various difficulties in their activities.

The birth of the opposition in 1976-1977 materialized through the sending of a letter of support to the 34 Czechoslovak signers of Charter 77. For the authors, this was simultaneously an act of solidarity and an act of defiance. The act of defiance was to rally a larger public to their side; the second campaign of protest against the persecution of the Charter signers, in 1978, was to collect 250 signatures.

The opponents are in fact persons who, without having a precise political program, hope to redefine their personal relations with the authorities and are attempting to conquer new fields of activity and expression outside of official channels. This step is damaging to the party in any case.

For the last three years the activity of the opposition--which includes at the maximum between 150 and 200 persons, almost exclusively in Budapest--has taken the following forms:

The drawing up of the SAMIZDAT [clandestinely-circulated manuscripts], that is, to say production and circulation of ideas and news concealed from the censors[7];

Creation of a support group for the poor. For in Hungary the number of poor people, forgotten in the development, is continually increasing, and poverty has become a structural phenomenon[8];

Creation, following the example of the Poles, of a free university, where one takes up the problems of Sovietology, of totalitarianisms, equally with the situation of the reformed churches;

Creation of an employment bureau to distribute occasional work to persons who have been hit by professional interdiction;

Creation of a committee of support for the victims of administrative persecutions.

This list expresses both an increase and an expansion of the activities capable of leading to an increasingly articulate and definite organization.

The fields of intervention are diverse; sometimes they concern cultural activities in a field that is ambiguous with respect to the authorities: artistic movements, theater groups, avant-garde painting, pop groups, or certain purely philosophical groups like the Budapest School before it split up.

With "Kadarism," all the social groups (even though none was entirely satisfied with its social and political position) gained something in exchange for being depoliticized. No one of them is in the situation of a pariah. Under these conditions the opposition must "climb" toward policy by a much more gradual and slower road than in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Despite this specificity, in two years its development has experienced significant growth; first of all, its activities are more structured, the groups that make it up are enlarging the circle of their participants and the number of persons who regularly follow their activities is increasing. Moreover, the opposition has succeeded in emerging from its original circle and reaching members of the intellectual establishment on the occasion of specific actions; this has expanded its influence. Last fall, this joining with the representatives of the establishment was accomplished on the occasion of the homage paid to the memory of a great political figure: Isvan Bibo, a political thinker who was a member of the peasant party between 1945 and 1948, a member of the last Imre Nagy cabinet, the author of "The Appeal to Western Governments" of 4 November 1956, and the memorandum of 4 January 1957, "How Can We Emerge From the Crisis?." Given a life sentence after 1956, released in 1963, Imre [as published] Bibo, until his recent death, led a completely marginal life; unlike other intellectuals, he had never asked to be reinstated.

Another attention-getting action took place last December: the exhibition and auction sale organized by the Initiative Group for the Support of the Poor or SZETA, which brought in 180,000 forints (1 forint = 0.18 Fr.). Officially, such an initiative is illegal: painters and sculptures do not have the right to sell their works, in a group and publicly, outside the official channel. By such interventions, however, the opposition has succeeded in appreciably expanding its influence.

Rather than a lucid and structured organization with a consistent line, the opposition represents more of a sensitivity, a sphere of influence which brings together volunteers who are ready to provide aid through a channel that seems more efficient than that of the official organizations.

The authorities are not remaining indifferent to the activities of the opposition. Last fall in Parliament Janos Kadar talked about this question at length, in extremely measured terms, stressing the dissimilarities between Hungary and Poland; in March of last year, on the other hand, at the party congress, he employed more negative and authoritarian tone in this connection. The positions taken by the leaders give the impression that the authorities are feeling their way as much as the opposition is in its organization. These authorities remain aware that they have to reckon with the opposition phenomenon, but they hope to avoid unleashing, by a blunder, a movement of the Czechoslovak or Polish type, which explains the absence, to this day, of brutal political and administrative measures such as prosecutions and arrests.

On the other hand, rampant repression has been established. Thus, persons who take part in opposition actions are hit with professional interdictions and can no longer find employment. The administration refuses to grant them a passport, either for trips to the West or the East. More insidiously, they are seeking to deny the signers of petitions or those who write in the SAMIZDAT the right to obtain academic titles. On the other hand, with the development of the activities of the SZETA, the cross-examinations and admonitions of the police have been seen to reappear. Administrative measures have also been introduced: municipalities and people's courts have the right to institute proceedings in a case of minor crime, according to a swift procedure in which the accused has no means of defense. Another measure consists of practicing police surveillance: every week the accused must present himself to the police, he is forbidden to leave his district, he does not have the right to walk on the main roads, to frequent public places, including his work place; after 2000 he may not leave his home and he may receive a visit from only two persons at the most. The last case of this kind goes back several years and was applied to Mr Haraszti; an attempt was made recently to reestablish this measure against several persons, chiefly a SAMIZDAT writer, G. Dalos. An evening of solidarity, bringing together several hundred intellectuals and artists, put an end to these harassments.

The government occasionally shows indecision. Recently, when an exhibition and sale was organized by 180 artists, the police attempted to discourage the initiative; the SZETA then addressed itself directly to the Central Committee of the party, with whom a compromise was set up: the Central Committee granted them a meeting place, on the condition that the meeting be organized under the auspices of the artists' committee and not under the auspices of the SZETA. But on other occasions the authorities have prevented similar meetings from being held, notably a concert that was to be given by the pianist Zoltan Kocsis; at the last moment the police forbade access to the hall. In the face of this vacillation, any prognosis of the future evolution would be hazardous. But, for all that the situation is being maintained as it has been, the authorities do not seem to want to change their relations with the intelligentsia. As an example, it is remarkable that two notorious and unrepentant opponents were allowed to return after long stays in Western Europe: M. G. Konrad, a famous writer well-known in the West, where he publishes books, and Mr Haraszti, an active member of the opposition and a correspondent, without a press card, for the old Parisian newspaper LIBERATION.

Decentralization, Autonomy

The search for a common strategy has stirred up a lengthy polemic among the intellectuals. The debate developed out of the theses, more reformist than radical, of the sociologist Andras Hegedus. Against those who hope to establish a multipartite political system, Mr Hegedus proposes to look for a pluralism without multipartism. According to him, pluralism is not only an ideologic, but also a practical requirement, for a multitude of activities are escaping the control of the higher authorities. In his eyes the "Polish compromise" shows the way to be followed and leads us to expect a new era in the societies of Eastern Europe. If it were maintained, this compromise would constitute the third type of "existing socialism" after the Soviet and Yugoslav models which, despite their differences, are nonpluralistic models, whereas the present Polish experiment is introducing a pluralistic dimension.

On the other hand, Mr Hegedus does not believe multipartism should be encouraged; that would crystallize the oppositions and experience has demonstrated that it would be intolerable to the Soviets. By activating the basic organizations, cooperatives,

brigades, small businesses, etc., Hungary could direct itself toward a "realistic democratic system" in which this conquered autonomy would be recognized by the government. It seems, moreover, that since the Polish crisis the "official" organizations like the basic labor unions, the brigades, etc. are seen to be entrusted with more active roles. Certain leaders, moreover, seem to be aware of the necessity to decentralize more, to give more power and responsibility to the lower authorities. And these questions are now being approached openly in the press: thus in the weekly ELET ES TRODALOM (LIFE AND LITERATURE), Reszo Nyers, a former member of the peasant party who was removed in 1974 after the conservatives returned in force, recently pled for the setting up of more radical reforms, especially in the area of institutions, advocating the development of genuine autonomy for business firms.

Andras Hegedus' relatively optimistic analyses are different from those of the pessimists, from the Bence-Kis group, who would like to play a role in Hungary analogous to that of the Polish KOR. However, differences really do exist between the two organizations. The KOR leaders have been fighting the government for several years and have been political prisoners; on the other hand, the KOR has designed a radical political program, while the Bence-Kis group largely confines itself to political and philosophical argument. Of course by its actions this group favors the democratization of public life; but its foundation is too much reduced to bring with it a popular allegiance to some of its ideas. According to Andras Hegedus, the principal role will in fact be played by the reformers within the party's machine and by the workers. The reaction of the latter, in any case, is the great unknown. Although they certainly approve of free trade unions, for all that they draw no practical conclusions from them, and they seek in the "second savings" and overtime the means to increase their income. There is such a manpower shortage that it is easy to improve their incomes by changing their work or working at two jobs. Although it recently put into operation a strong deflationary policy whose effect is to reduce the buying power and the level of the domestic demand[9], the government took pains to announce in late February that the 5-day week would soon be passed: a measure that in itself will have scarcely any consequences, the real work week--official job plus moonlighting--being much longer. Thus, the Hungarian working class does not seem to be following the example of the Polish workers. On the other hand, the situation would be in very great danger of deteriorating in one or two years if the stabilization plan were to fail.

For now, and although the principal agent of change--the working class--is absent from the debate, the intellectuals, stimulated by the Polish model, are still the only ones to lay down for the society the essential political alternative: management of compromise or a break with the system.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. X. Richet, "Regulation dans la planification decentralisee. Un essai sur le nouveau mecanisme economique en Hongrie, 1968-1980" [Regulation in Decentralized Planning. An Essay on the New Economic Mechanism in Hungary, 1968-1980], a thesis presented at the University of Paris X, 1980.

2. For an analysis of the movement for post-Stalinist reforms, see Mr Rakovsky, "le Marxisme face aux pays de l'Est" [Marxism Facing the Eastern Countries], Savelli, 1977.

3. Cf. F. Feher, "Le kadarisme comme Etat khrouchtchevien modele" [Kadarism as a Model Khrushchevian State], in LIBRE, No 7, 1980.

4. Cf. "L'ecole de Budapest" [The Budapest School], in LES TEMPS MODERNES, August-September 1974.

5. This explains why the theories of R. Bahro aroused only a very little interest among opposition elements in Eastern Europe.

6. "Le Salaire aux pieces" [Piecework Wages], Seuil, Paris, 1976.

7. Cf. "Opposition = 0.1 Percent," LE SAMIZDAT HUNGROIS, Seuil, Paris, 1979.

8. Sociologist I. Kemeny conducted an in-depth investigation on this problem.

9. On the economic aspects of the 1980 reform, cf. Xavier Richet, "Reforme dans la reforme? La nouvelle politique economique hongroise au seuil des annees 1980" ["Reform Within Reform? The New Hungarian Economic Policy on the Threshold of the 1980's]. Center for International Economics of the Socialist Countries. CNRS-ERA [expansion unknown], February 1981.

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TEXT OF THESES ON SOLIDARITY'S ACTIVITIES

Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish No 3, 17 Apr 81 Supplement pp 1-8

[Unsigned text: "Theses for Discussion: The Trade Union's Directions of Action in the Nation's Present Situation"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The National Consultative Commission (KPP) of the Independent, Self-Governing Trade Union (NSZZ) Solidarity has recomended to the Center for Social, Professional, and Occupational Studies (OPSZ) that it draft a platform ["theses]" for discussion of "Solidarity's" program of action by its membership. The Program and Consultation Council (RPK) has devoted four successive sessions to drafting this document. The resulting text has been disseminated to all Interfactory Founding Committees (MKZs). Prior to that, the draft document, prepared by writers' teams, had been discussed at the 25 February 1981 session of the KPP.

We now publish below the complete text of this document, being convinced that it should be known and discussed by every element of our union. Thus the union's program will be outlined in the course of widespread discussion in which TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC [SOLIDARITY WEEKLY] promises to take an active part.

I. Basic Values

Our trade union was formed barely half a year ago, owing to a workers struggle that was supported by the entire country. We are now a major social force with our multimillion membership. Owing to this, the entire world of work in Poland can finally promote its common cause in a seemly and effective manner. We were born to protest against injury, humiliation, and injustice. We are an independent and self-governing union of working people from every region and from every occupation or profession. We defend the rights, dignity, and interests of the entire world of work.

We want to shape life in our country in accordance with ideals of patriotism, social justice, and civic democracy. Being a trade union, we do not intend to supplant the State authority in its tasks, but we wish to represent before

it the interests of working people. We will thus defend rights--the rights of the individual, the citizen, and the worker. At the same time, we are not evading responsibility for the fate of our nation and state.

1. The best traditions of the nation, the ethical principles of Christianity, the political summons to democracy and socialist social thought--such are the four principal sources of our inspiration.

We feel a deep attachment to the heritage of the entire Polish culture, immersed in European culture and strongly linked to Catholicism but combining in itself diverse religious traditions and world outlooks. In us lives the feeling of a shared bond with generations of Poles who struggled for national liberation and social justice and who transmitted to us the traditions of toleration and fraternity as well as of civic responsibility for the Polish Republic and equality before the law. Hence we have room for all, regardless of their world outlook, ethnic origin, or political conviction.

2. The idea of the mutual association of working people magnifies the quality of the values engendered by common action. These values are: /solidarity/, from which we took our trade union's name; and also /comradeship and willingness for self-sacrifice/ and for making sacrifices for both the trade union community and the broader public interest. Yet another such value should be the idea of the /brotherhood of working people/ in their common front against exploitation regardless of the slogans with which that exploitation is camouflaged.

3. Our principal task as a trade union--the defense of the working people--is based on the principle of observation of /social justice/. We shall strive to make that principle the basis of activity by the state and by its offices and institutions, as well as the foundation of any solution relating to social policies and the organization of the community's life.

We base social justice on the principle of the innate /dignity of the individual, the dignity of the workingman and his labor/. We desire that the principle of the dignity of the individual permeate the entire life of our trade union and be the foundation for building relations in a new society.

From the principle of social justice, and from dignity of the individual, it ensues that fundamentally /all men are equal/. We shall thus strive to translate into reality /social equality/.

We recognize the principle of remuneration according to the quality and quantity as well as according to the laboriousness and harmfulness of labor /"to each a cording to his labor"/ and we shall strive to balance any unjustified disproportions in that respect. However, /this principle ranks second to the principal of satisfaction of the social minimum/, that is, satisfaction of elementary needs for food, clothing, and dwelling, as well as of all those social and cultural needs which make possible a life of dignity and hence also of the development of the human personality.

In our struggle for just remuneration of labor we shall be demanding of ourselves as regards honest work performance, lofty work ethics, solidity and good workmanship. Poor workmanship and the making of shoddy products or "junk" are contrary to the dignity of the worker and cause harm to society.

From the principle of equality it ensues that complete /democracy/ must be observed in public life. Only if the system is truly democratic we can effectively struggle for our trade union and worker interests. Only in such a system can the principle of /authentic participation by working people in the nation's social and public life/ be translated into reality. Hence we shall strive to broaden the forms of participation by society in public decisions as well as forms of public supervision of the actions of the authorities.

4. Our trade union activity requires observance of the /civic freedoms/ stated in the constitution of the Polish People's Republic, that is, of the /right to voice one's own views, freedom of speech and press, the right to objective information, the right of public assembly, and the right of association/. We shall defend individuals suffering repressions for using these rights, viewing such repressions as violations of the law. For these reasons also we shall demand the abolition of restrictions on the right of association as well as the abolition of restrictions relating to censorship especially as regards censorship of activities that do not pertain to the common good but ensue from manipulations intended to protect the current interests of the ruling circles.

5. Our trade union is linked to the /traditions of the worker movement/ and reinvigorates those aspects of that tradition which shall strengthen our ideals of social justice, democracy, freedom, and independence. We shall enrich that tradition with the memory of demonstrations by the workers of Poznan in 1956, the blood of the worker victims on the Coast in 1970 and of the workers of Radom and the Ursus [tractor factory] in 1976.

The /1 May Holiday/ acquires a special symbolism. We must imbue that holiday with a new content and a new form, because it is our holiday--the holiday of working people, and not the holiday of the state as the employer. That is to say, it will be a holiday without division into tribunes [platforms for dignitaries] and the parade; a festive meet of working people in a spirit of solidarity and equality.

6. We acknowledge /national values/ to be a valuable and organic part of our collective awarness and we believe that Polish patriotism is an irreplaceable plane of integration and public spirit of self-sactifice for the Fatherland. We believe that national values provide the fundamental bond for our national cohesiveness in the modern world and represent the ultimate justification of our independence and sovereignty. The social protest represented by last summer's strikes, which is a wellspring of our trade union, was also directed against the elimination of our national values from public awareness.

7. Our trade union is an /organization representing diverse viewpoints/ and open both to persons of any religious persuasion and to nonbelievers, but an overwhelming majority of our membership has, like the majority of our nation, been brought up in the Christian religion. /Christian inspiration/ has been a basis for the ideological values which we incorporate in our program. The cross that

hangs alongside the eagle [the symbol of Polish statehood] in many trade union locals reminds our members of their moral heritage and inspires them with faith in the justice of our cause. We shall adhere to this source of inspiration without in the least abandoning the secular nature of our organization.

II. Political Sources of the Crisis

We all must jointly overcome the economic crisis which threatens us with disaster. But we shall not accomplish this unless we uncover and eliminate its politicosocial causes. The roots of this crisis can be traced to the decline of democratic institutions and the attendant deep division between society and the authorities in our system of public life so far. The crisis has also been brought about by mistaken dictrinal concepts and by decisions affecting, among other things, agriculture (deliberate elimination of private farm ownership), the setting up of the priority of the production of means of production at the expense of consumer needs, and the takeover of the cooperatives and private light industry by the state.

1. A dominant feature of this system is the /absence of democratic decisionmaking mechanisms, of responsibility for decisions, and of replacement of individuals holding managerial positions/. Decisions concerning the entire nation are being made by party and administrative agencies without heeding public opinion. These decisions are not preceded by free discussion in the course of which various solutions to problem could be made public: There is no room for opinions by independent experts, and there is no access to indispensable information about the state of the state and the economy. Thus the public is excluded from the decisionmaking process. The decisions are made by one member of the bureaucracy or another.

2. /Bureaucratic methods of rule preclude the correcting of mistakes./ Often it is impossible to even draw attention to catastrophic consequences of mistaken decisions. This is chiefly made impossible by censorship and the exaggerated emphasis on state, economic, and official secrets, as well as by the nature of the entire system, which is oriented toward opposing any attempts to develop alternative programs and independent assessments and analyses. This blockade is extended not only to matters of political and social importance but also to economic and even technical matters. This causes losses reaching hundreds of billions of zlotys.

3. Within the bureaucratic system for ruling the country and managing its economy /there has arisen a closed class of rulers who are not subject to control by the ruled./ The members of the apparatus of authority make decisions that are based on considerations of personal interest, material privileges, and self-advancement, rather than on considerations of public interest. Mistaken investment decisions (e.g., the building of the Katowice Iron and Steel Plant) and the wasted foreign loans have often resulted from machinations by diverse mutually supporting or clashing vested-interest groups operating within the apparatus of authority.

The economic bureaucracy has to a large extent prevented during 1976-1979 the adoption of measures that could have averted the outbreak of the crisis. As a rule, too, the bureaucratic apparatus has been opposed to any change or reform that might undermine its position, income, and influence.

4. As a result of all this, Poland had no chance of socioeconomic reform and there was not chance for rescuing us from the crisis. /The existing political system was unable to correct itself and lacked the potential for that./ Only the severe economic crisis, the outbreak of the social protest, and the rise of Solidarity opened the road to reform and renewal.

From this follows an important conclusion: The economic reform in Poland cannot succeed and yield the expected economic and social results unless it is accompanied by a far-reaching reform of the system of administrative rule which will eliminate the roots of the crisis which stem from the sociopolitical system and provide guarantees that the former system will not return.

III. Economic Issues

1. The Position of Solidarity on the Recurrent Economic Crises

The deep economic crisis in our country is chiefly manifesting itself through the tremendous and growing disporportion between the supply and demand of goods and services and is present in every field of the economy. This crisis has arisen neither in recent months nor in recent years but gradually in the course of decades. It is a crisis ensuing from a deep degeneration of a production system that is incapable of satisfying demand both in variety and in quantity. This crisis directly affects the living standards of society and the working conditions and level of real wages of the working people. In the present growing crisis we are facing a real decrease in these low wages.

The crisis of the economy of the PRL affects its structure, economic policy, and system, and in recent years this has been accompanied by unfavorable world-market conditions.

a) /Defects in the Economic Structure as a Direct Cause of the Difficulties/

The structural nature of the crisis is reflected in the steady and growing imbalance between the consumer economy and that part of the economy concerned with the expansion of means of production. An excessive part of the nation's economic potential has been set aside for the production of machinery and equipment for producing new machinery and equipment, while the production of consumer goods is a secondary part of this structure. In particular, agriculture, that is, the branch of the economy that satisfies the basic needs of the population, has been relegated to a secondary place in the national economy. Clearly, an economy with such a structure cannot even provide moderately satisfactory living standards for the working people.

b) Permanent Defects of Economic Policy

The structural disproportions of the economy result from a long-lasting economic policy conducted in an arbitrary manner by a small group of individuals and institutions not subject to popular influence. The concentration of decision-

making within a few chief centers, the absence of cost-effectiveness analysis and the price chaos have besides rendered any kind of influence by public opinion completely impossible. The situation has thus been that of complete economic arbitrariness and lack of responsibility, resulting in the adoption of economically harmful decisions and undertaking of gigantic investment projects without adequate justification and without assuring the conditions for their functioning (transport, energy, coproduction). Under this arbitrary policy, private farming has been the subject of special discrimination, especially through restrictions on allocation of scarce machinery and [through discriminatory] pricing.

Attempts were made to compensate for the inefficiency of the system and of economic policy through growing foreign loans. Capitalist bankers were supposed to finance the economic malaise of the centrally planned state economy. But loans have to be repaid, and with interest at that, which is possible only in an efficient economy. Thus this method of compensation could not be practiced long and, what is more, it became another factor in the collapse. The end result is the huge indebtedness of more than $24 billion, not including short-term loans, and the prospects for continued indebtedness. The country must allocate funds for payment of interest and repayment of loans in installments in amounts greater than its revenues from exports. This means that our entire imports have to be based on additional credits. These additional credits are incrdasingly difficult to obtain and their terms (interest rates and repayment schedules set by foreign banks) are increasingly harsher. We are simply considered bankrupt and treated correspondingly.

In such a situation, sufficient imports of goods from the West cannot be guaranteed for our economy. Thus imports of raw and other materials and even of spare parts are being restricted, and it is this, above all, that is the chief factor in the incomplete utilization of the production capacities of our economy.

c) /System Factors/

The deepest roots of the crisis are systemic. All economic decisions have been monopolized by the central authorities, which issue orders to individual enterprises as to how much and what they are to produce. This is called /managing the economy through the ordering and allocation system/. In such a situation, the enterprises have no freedom at all to determine their own production programs and select their own methods of production, and hence the introduction of cost-effectivness analysis at the level of many enterprises is pointless. Such an analysis is not done either by the central planner, owing to the absence of appropriate information in the form of proper prices. The situation is aggravated by the striving of enterprises to maximize expenditures owing to their interest in fulfilling the plan in terms of value by, among other things, increasing their costs. The growing concentration of decisionmaking has ultimately resulted in complete failure to utilize mechanisms to motivate the individual worker and worker teams. All this, taken together, has led to a huge waste of human labor and resources. Suffice it to mention that the production of a unit of national income in Poland requires the consumption of much more raw materials, energy, transport services and labor than in the French or West German economy.

d) /Fortuitous Factors/

Certain unfavorable natural conditions have also been burdening our nation in recent years; for example, the poor harvest in 1980. When assessing this, it should be considered, however, that every economy should be prepared for occasional periods of decline and should have the resources to withstand them. If, on the other hand, an economy collapses owing to temporary unfavorable circumstances, they are no longer objective causes, the real causes being a faulty economic system, poor policies and a profoundly imbalanced economic structure.

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Owing to the operation of all the aforementioned factors, the economy of the Polish People's Republic is performing poorly. This has been reflected in the declining rate of increase in national income, and during the last 2 years, in its steep decline. As a result, the country is living through a severe crisis that threatens the national economy with a complete collapse.

2. Solidarity's Position on the Economic Reform

a) /Support of the Reform as a Condition for Its Success/

The conducted analysis shows that the present economic system does not correspond to social and economic needs. The only way to permanently overcome the crisis and lead our economy out onto the raod of balanced development is a far-reaching reform of the system which will eliminate the sources of the constantly recurrent critical tensions. Our trade union supports fully the issue of economic reform, believing that it is in the interest of its members and the entire public.

Our support of the reform must be expressed in, among other things, a broad discussion of its premises and an explicit definition of its directions, forms, and purposes. By defining through discussions the desirable outline of the reform, we shall prevent its dilution and distortions. Solidarity will not, however, propose its own draft of the reform, since it believes that a purposive shape of the reform can be outlined through discussion of the already existing proposals. One may ask, though, whether Solidarity should not take a more active part in the preparation and implementation of the reform, by, e.g., drafting its own proposals for solutions of key issues.

Reforms should be the result of free and public discussion by experts, and they should be introduced by the state authorities which control the whole of the national economy. /It is the task of the trade union, on the other hand, to ensure that the introduced reforms would result in improvimg the position of working people/. The trade union will thus support the economic reforms that are in accord with the principles of a just social policy and at the same time provide the best chances for a permanent rather than temporary improvement in the nation's economic situation. In defining the conditions that must be satisfied in the course of the reforms, we are aware that current interests must sometimes be sacrificed for the sake of a far-reaching and real improvement. We can undertake such a risk only when and if we and the entire public are

consulted on all decisions concerning the reform, when and if we are provided with the full picture of the gains and losses entailed in individual solutions, and when and if the basic principles of the state's social policy are agreed upon with us and followed.

b) /Nature of the Expected Changes/

The economic reform should shape in a new manner the structure and functioning of central planning, main centers of authority, socialized enterprises, and other components of the economic system.

Central planning should be bereft of its directive-addressing nature, that is, it should not impose tasks on enterprises through orders and prohibitions. The operations of the enterprises should rather be manipulated through economic instruments (e.g., prices, taxes, etc.).

/Central plans should be of a strategic rather than operational nature/ and should be determined for periods of several years at a time. The tasks of the central plan that decide the directions of economic development should be determined through the socialized planning process. The participation of the public in the planning process and its control over that process should be assured through publicity of decisions and discussions by the Sejm, self-governing bodies public institutions, and trade unions. The factors to be placed under social [public] control should include the main directions of development, the rate of economic growth, and the division of national income into investments and consumption (including the principal directions of public consumption). Such social control should also assure the protection of autonomous socialized enterprises and family-owned farms against restrictions by the fait of economic and social administration. The intermediate links between the enterprises and the central management of economy, such as the industrial sector ministries and associations, to a large extent should be disbanded.

/Socialized enterprises should be granted autonomy/ as regards determining their own production programs and methods. In this connection, centralized distribution of raw materials and other production factors should be restricted or, where needed, eliminated. The activity of an enterprise should be based on self-financing, that is, on defraying its expenditures from its own income. The performance of an enterprise should be evaluated not in terms of its plan fulfillment but in terms of its economic effects. The enterprise should be fred to dispose of the funds it earns and to allocate them for its own investments, especially for efficient maintenance of equipment. The manner of functioning of an enterprise, the degree of its autonomy, and the extent to which it is administered socially, should depend on its size and nature. A prerequisite for proper performance of the enterprise under the new syttem should be the disbanding of market monopolies and the appearnce, to some extent, of competition among producers.

Changes in the price system will be a major dilemma to Solidarity. These changes are needed for efficient performance of enterprises but they may be difficult to implement, especially as regards retail prices, as they then will require wage adjustments and convincingthe entire trade union and public opinion about their expediency. This requtes broad discussion.

/Different forms of ownership of means of production should have the same legal and economic conditions for development under the new system./ Socialized enterprises, cooperatives, communally owned enterprises, and private or family-owned enterprises should recieve equal treatment as regards marketing prices, supplies, and personnel and taxation policies. In particular, all restrictions on the development of family-owned farms and family-owned artisan and service enterprises should be removed.

/A consistent implementation of the program for feeding the nation with the resources of Polish agriculture itself is one of the most important economic tasks facing the country./ The basic elements of such a program should be: "Absolute respect for ownership of land by private farmers and a marked intensification of their provision with agricultural machinery, tools, artificial fertilizers, and other products needed to intensify agricultural production.

The functioning of such a planned-market economy is causing the appearance of certain social problems on which our trade union must take an explicit position. Our trade union recognizes that /enterprises should have the right to adjust their employment levels/ to their own needs, while the state authorities are to continue to be responsible for implementing the policy of full employment. But this policy should not longer be implemented by burdening the enterprises; instead, suitable funds should be set up centrally for providing new employment and paying the cost of the retraining and transfer of surplus employees of industry and administration to other economic sectors and occupations and profesions. The financial autonomy of enterprises may also result in the restriction and elimination of enterprises. In such cases, the trade union will strive for a proper protection of the interests of the personnel of such enterprises.

/Effective participation of enterprise crews in enterprise profits may increase the differentiation in the incomes of the employees of different enterprises./ This problem should also be discussed within our trade union. A far-reaching increase in the autonomy of enterprises and the basing of the economy on the market system may entaileconomic and social difficulties (price increases, underemployment, etc.). Thus the course of the reform will have to be carefully watched in order to eliminate the attendant anomalies.

The establishment of the autonomy of socialized enterprises makes possible and necessary the /convening of authentic workers self-government/ in these enterprises. Our trade union considers such convening to be an indispensable element of the economic reform. Self-government in enterprises should have powers enabling it to have an effective voice in the activities of the enterprise, and hence it should also havethe right to dispose of the enterprise's property and to decide on the directions of production and sales, methods of production, and directions of investments. It should also decide on the division of the enterprise's income. Particular solutions may depend on, among other things, the size and nature of individual enterprises. It is especially necessary for workers self-government to participate in the appointment and recall of directors (nomination, expression of opinions, or organization of competitive appointments). The problem of workers self-government should be widely discussed within the trade union.

Our trade union will represent the social foundation for workers self-government and provide it with complete support. But /the powers of workers self-government and of the trade union organization at the individual plant must be clearly separated,/with the criterion for the separation being the principle that the trade union chiefly defends the interests of wage-receiving workers, whereas workers self-government represents and is responsible for the production-economic interests of the enterprise. The workers self-government must consult the trade union organization on all aspects of the division of the enterprise's income that concern the crew of the enterprise.

/The trade union believes that the economic reform should be introduced as rapidly as possible, in its entirety, and through a democratic process./ In particular, we believe that the introduction of the economic reform should not be postponed until our economy is completely stabilized. Hence, there is need for rapid preparation of a program to halt the economy's trend toward decline. But the preparations for the reform will also need restoring a normal work rhythm and identifying domains of material collaboration in such fields as improvements in enterprise management, the determination of the most effective forms of self-government, the fight against alcoholism, etc.

3. The Trade Union's Position on the Basic Problems of Social Policy

There exists a danger that the living standards of the population will deteriorate in 1981. Above all, the foreign-trade situation will further deteriorate. There are no guarantees that our country will obtain this year the $10 or $11 billion needed in additional credits, of which $6 or 7 billion is needed to repay indebtedness, $3 or $4 billion to pay interest on loans, and $1 billion to cover the current deficit. If we do not obtain these credits, the decline in production may be extremely large and will directly affect consumption. The possibilities for increasing consumption through shifts in the division of national income, i.e., by limiting investments so as to increase consumption, are very limited. The reason is that it is not possible to further restrict nonproduction investments in such fields as housing, public health, or education.

There exists a threat of total disorganization of the market for consumer goods. In 1981 the monetary income of the population will be greater than in 1980, but the deliveries of manufactured goods will be insufficient. Similarly in agriculture, the year 1981 cannot be good because the renewal of the livestock herd following its depletion in 1980 will not yet be possible. In practice, thus, the entire annual increase in population income will not be offset by an increase in consumer goods.

a) /The Principle of the State's Responsibility for the Cost of the Crisis and Reforms/

The union believes that responsibility for the effects of the crisis and the reforms to be introduced rests on the state, regardless of whether the economic reform to be introduced will or will not indeed assure autonomous status of the enterprises and regardless of the form of that reform. This is because the state is in practice the direct organizer of economic life in Poland. Hence also, regardless of the activities of the various trade unions and social organizations and associations, it is precisely the state and its agencies that have the duty of protecting the population against the effects of the crisis, and this is how the trade union will view the state agencies.

/The government has not presented a program for rescuing the nation from the crisis. The plan for 1981, recently voted by the Sejm, does not deal with the crucial problems./ The long-promised plan for stabilization still does not exist. Public opinion an our trade union have not yet received even a report on the state of the economy. This inactivity is bound to aggravate the crisis. The government should at once present a program for rescuing the country from the crisis and submit it for nationwide discussion. In view of the passive attitude of the authorities, our trade union is forced to come forward with its own initiative. We do not intend to supplant the government. All we wish is to indicate the fundamental directions of economic and social policy that are essential from the standpoint of working people,and that at the same time decide many elements of the nation's economic situation.

/The trade union Solidarity understands/ that the nation's economic situation is truly desperate and hence in 1981 / it will not make far-reaching wage and social demands,/ in the expectation that:

--the principles of the government's economic policy--especially in the field of direct interest to the trade union--will be agreed upon with the trade union;

--the government will pledge itself to consistently implement a reform program assuring a future commensurate rapid and concerted development of the economy (the general principles of such reforms are presented in the following chapter);

--the government's economic policy will respect in deed and not just in words the principles of assuring an average level of real income of the population and assign priority to the economically weaker groups.

b) /The Principle of the Good Market/

Seven months following the signing of the poststrike agreements, the principal complaint of working people concerns the fatal and steadily deteriorating state of the market. Empty store shelves and commercial warehouses make questionable the wage increases that we had fought for and won. The growing length of the queues in front of stores and the rising black market disorganize the lives of our families. In such a situation an increased supply of staple goods to the market is necessary and must be achieved. However, a rapid improvement in the supply of all foodstuffs is not yet feasible. In such a situation, two proposals for emergency solutions must be considered and discussed. One proposal admits the possibility of expanding the rationing system while the other is decisively opposed to the introduction and maintenance of that system.

/The first proposal/ admits the need for a healthy market, especially as regards the profitability of agriculture, which requires changes in procurement and retail prices. It considers /rationing as a necessary evil./ In the presence of a marked shortage of staple goods, money cannot be the sole regulator of the distribution of gods. Without rationing it will be difficult to assure a minimum supply of staple goods, especially for subsistence earners.

/The other proposal is opposed to expanding the rationing system/ and postulates the elimination of current rationing as soon as possible, on the grounds that the introduction of rationing causes unneeded surpluses in some households and shortages in others and that it undermines the role of wages as an incentive for good workmanship. According to this proposal, the operation of the price mechanism is a much better method than rationing and that this [principle] in any event deserves public approval.

Both proposals should be widely discussed within the trade union.

c) /The Principle of the Social Minimum/

We demand the full implementation of all the wage and social pledges of the government as specified in the agreements. In particular, we ex pect the speediest possible aplication of the principle of the social minimum to the incomes policy as regards wages, pensions, benefits, increase in family allowances, and the introduction of longer maternity leaves. We do not, on the other hand, demand new wage regulations.

In particular, /our least wealthy citizens should in no case be burdened with the cost of the reform./ It is necessary to determine the minimal needs of the average citizen depending on age and family status, and the corresponding social minimum should be controlled and adjusted depending on the changes in market supply, prices of goods, and structure of consumption. The increase of the numbers of the poor should not be permitted, and the social minimum should be guaranteed by the state to everyone in Poland regardless of whether he is employed or, through his own fault not employed. An endeavor should also be made to assure that anyone living below that minimum be provided with financial and material assistance by the state. The trade union for its part shall monitor both the height of that minimum and the criteria for its determination, as well as the implementation by the state of a program for providing all citizens with the social minimum.

We are aware that even the implementation of such a modest program will additionally increase the financial resources of the population that cannot be offset by a corresponding increase in consumer goods. In our opinion, these decisions must nevertheless be adopted, because only they can improve the material situation of the oppulation groups existing in the most difficult situation. When evaluating this demand it should be borne in mind that an additional increase in the living standards of people who at present subsist below the social minimum as well as the cost of the policy of increasing family allowances and granting longer maternity leaves, and also of the policy of reevaluating pensions, benefits, etc., when taken all together, will add only modestly to the amount of the ready money at the disposal of the population that cannot be offeset by a corresponsing increase in the supply of consumer goods. Thus the abandonment of this program would only negligibly contribute to improving the market equilibrium, and it would be done at the expense of people whose situation is the most difficult. Our trade union will never agree to savings of this kind.

The proper application of the principle of the social minimum requires a receptive public opinion. The problem of the minimum is connected with the issues of the maximum. It is necessary to specify the income level which cannot be exceeded.

In this connection, we demand, among other things, the annulment of the Decree of 1972 concerning the excessively high pensions and benefits for privileged persons and their families, benefits which deviate from the general principle.

d) /The Principle of Proportional Allocation of the Costs of the Crisis/

Social justice requires that the costs of the crisis and of the indispensable reforms be uniformly apportioned among all citizens--uniformly means here proportionately to their individual wealth. Poland is a country with a wide span in the incomes of discrete social groups. Hence the costs of the crisis should be borne to a greater extent by wealthier individuals and to a smaller extent by poorer ones, which should be properly reflected in the system of increases in wages and taxes. No one--regardless of the position he occupies in the state--may be exempt from this principle, and its implementation requires monitoring by the trade union and other social organizations. This requires thorough discussion in the light of the needs, aspirations, and traditions of individual occupational and professional communities. The main concern here is that the application of this principle should not result in depriving highly qualified and sacrificially working occupational and professional groups of the feelings of the worthiness of their labor and reducing their motivation for an intensified production effort.

/The cost of the program for restoring the equilibrium should be borne chiefly by the wealthiest groups,/ especially by individuals benefiting from the privileges associated with the exercise of authority. This policy should be pursued by the trade union calmly but decisively, because in the 1970s there occurred a marked increase in social inequities, and a still greater increase in the privileges of individuals exercising authority. Yet it is precisely this group of people that is directly responsible for the present situation of our country. The maintenance of privileges for representatives of the authorities is socially dangerous and in the present situation deeply immoral. Persons who exercise power are isolated by their privileges from the realities of the life of normal citizens, alientated from society, and incapable of understanding the problems of society.

In view of the economic situations and the requirements of social justice, we should put forward the following demands to the authorities:

--the introduction of universally mandatory progressive equalization tax, to be paid in cases in which the total income per family member exceeds the level of the average monthly wage;

--the taxing of luxury products (luxury automobiles, vacation homes, etc.);

--the restriction of unjustified material privileges of the apparatus of authority (housing, official cars, special health service, etc.) and publicity about incomes and property of persons occupying positions in that apparatus.

The above-proposed redistribution measures as well as a system for compensating population income for price increases--which postulated full compensation only for the population groups existing in the most difficult material situation--will

make possible not only a reduction in those inequities which cannot be accepted by society but also the financing of the most indispensable social programs. The adoption of all these measures, taken together, will also serve to restore the market equilibrium.

The trade union is aware that the market equilibrium must be restored gradually but as rapidly as possible. We are also aware that this cannot be achieved solely through stimulating an increase in production and in market supply. Price increases are also inevitable. We acknowledge this. But price increases may result in a decline in real wages. In such a situation, our trade union faces the problem of taking a position on this issue. The lowest wage earners should receive full compensation for the increase in the cost of living owing to price increases, but at the same time the highest wage earners should receive no such compensation at all. But as regards /wage earners in the in-between category/, who represent the majority, two possible solutions have to be considered: /either a partial compensation for the increase cost of living,/ and hence also an improvement in the market equilibrium, /or full compensation/, which would aggravate the market situation and delay the solution of the crisis. Both solutions should be widely discussed within the trade union.

Of a certainty, compensation should not be provided for increases in the prices of luxury goods and tobacco and alcohol. The probelm of compensations for price increases must be solved comprehensively, in accordance with the corresponding clause in the poststrike agreements. The system of such compensations should be agreed upon in detail with the trade union and submitted for public discussion, because the effectiveness and social acceptance of the compensations depend on the selection of the appropriate variant of their calculation and payment.

e) /The Universal Right to Work/

The job market is already experiencing its first difficulties and it can be expected that the broadening of the effects of the crisis /may result in unemployment in certain regions and population groups./ It is also to be expected that during the first stage of introduction of the economic reform this problem will cause special difficulties and require committing the efforts of the trade union in close cooperation with the management of labor establishments and with the central economic authorities. This is because the problem of employment requires a division of tasks between enterprises and central economic authorities; in this connection, for the sake of effective management, the enterprises should have the right to adjust the level of their employment to their own needs, /while the central authorities are responsible for the full employment of every worker/ through an active policy of creating new jobs and setting up a social fund to defray the cost of retraining workers and providing unemployment assistance. At the same time, it will be necessary to initiate programs for job retraining to be financed by the state and approved and monitored by the trade union.

At the same time also, an important and highly difficult matter is that of /providing suitable jobs for the graduates of all types of schools./ This requires an analysis of the utilization of the skills of workers, replacement

of those not properly trained, an occupational and professional redeployment to be accomplished in a judicious manner, the assurance of greater mobility of workers on the national scale, etc. This year and in the next few years the situation of the youth graduating from higher schools is particularly difficult.

These measures, which may originate major tensions and even social in-ustices, should be pondered well in advance and discussed within individual occupational and professional communities, depending on the acuteness of potential unemployment in one given field or another. The trade union should also consider the need--which may even be imperative--to organize its own extensive and long-term system for occupational and professional retraining.

f) /Improvements in Working Conditions/

The economic reform that is intended to make enterprises autonomous and free them from the order-and-directive system must be paralleled by measures to substantially improve the working conditions of enterprise personnel. At the present moment, many enterprise crews work under conditions that are difficult or even dangerous to health. The enterprises should be obligated to assign a specific percentage of their sinking fund and enterprise development fund--to be specified by the worker self-government--for improvements in working conditions; the minimum level of deductions for this purpose should be specified by legislation.

In view of the numerous violations of health-protection standards in labor establishments (toxic factors, dust, noise, microclimate, etc.), as established by health inspectors, the trade union should demand that Poland ratify ILO Convention No 148 of 1977 concerning the protection of workers against dangers due to air pollution, noise, and vibration, and that the Polish labor-protection regulations be closely adapted to the requirements of that convention.

An important factor in the proper development of the performance of the enterprises and the entire national economy is utilizing the reduction of working hours as a factor that can provide strong incentives for streamlining enterprise performance and stimulating workers to labor productively. In the course of negotiations for the implementation of the second stage of such reductions, it should be demanded of the enterprise management and the administration that they prepare specific plans for organizational streamlining and technical projects to offset the reduction in working hours.

IV. Guarantees for the Future

1. Legality

In our view the restoration of complete legality in relations between the authorities and society and the principle of self-government and openness of public life are matters of fundamental importance. The attainment of legality is indispensable to normal cooperation between Solidarity and elements of the state authorities, and to emergence from the political and economic crisis currently gripping Poland.

Legality means that /the law should express the interests and will of the nation, and that it should be equally binding on the state and the citizen/. No one can stand above and beyond the law. Government by law should be supreme to the apparatus of state power and administration, including the economic apparatus. Citizens and their organizations should be subject to the law. Everyone should be equal before the law. There must be only one set of laws, just to everyone regardless of the social or governmental position he occupies.

It is necessary to restore high rank to the courts as agencies appointed to decide on disputes not only between citizens but also between the citizen or his organizations and the agencies of the state. The reason is that we consider the courts--as independent institutions--to be the natural guarantors of the rights and freedoms of citizens.

The administration of justice requires, in accordance with universal postulates, expansion through: 1) /broadening the competencies of administrative courts of justice/ as regards verdicts on violations of the political rights of citizens (the right of association, the right of assembly, freedom of speech and press, etc.); 2) /the appointment of a constitutional judicial system/ in order to make the constitution a living and respected law; 3) /the appointment of a state Tribunal/ to judge persons who, while holding the highest positions, abused their positions and caused danger to great harm to the state. We support those voices of public opinion which demand /judicial verdicts along with the application of detention as a preventive measure/. We also believe that it is necessary to strengthen supervision by prosecutor's offices over security agencies in order to provide due protection of rights of suspects regardless of the procedural assurance of their protection during the initial stages of the proceeding. We believe that the offices of public prosecutors should be incorporated in the Ministry of Justice and thus, like the government, subjected to supervision by the Sejm.

/We are in favor of the unremovability of judges/ and hence also the abolition of the universally criticized limitations on the terms of office of members of the Supreme Court, which violate the principle of judicial independence. A related precondition is the proper selection of councillors for various kinds of courts. The current method of appointing councillors does not assure their proper selection. We believe that councillors should be elected publicly along with councillors of basic and voivodship ranks.

The administration of justice should be accessible to all and hence the income-based nature of judicial fees should be abolished, as should be the emphasis placed by the Ministry of Justice on procuring revenues for the Exchequer at any price.

Legality requires the existence of not only judicial supervision but also public supervision of the activities of the agencies of public order and security. The Sejm and the people's councils should systematically conduct open and public debates of the activities of these agencies. Publicity about the penal conditions of prisoners as well as the monitoring of their working conditions by the trade union should also be assured.

We demand that legislation include the complete scope of trade union freedoms as recognized by the ratification of corresponding international conventions, as well as the right to strike and other means whereby workers can assure themselves of their full rights. We also demand the inviolability of the ownership of private family farms.

Since--as we claim--the law should be an expression of the interests and will of the public, the representative organs endowed with legislative and regulatory powers should derive from genuine elections. In this connection, /we regard as necessary the introduction of a new procedure for elections to the Sejm and the people's councils, /such as would assure free nomination fo candidates for deputies and people's counsil members by organizations and groups of citizens, and such that voters would perform in a free manner the selection of their representatives.

2. Openness of Public Life and Censorship Problems

An effective protection of the interests of the world of work is, like other forms of civic activity, possible only if the principle of openness is followed in our public life. This concerns, on the one hand, the freedom of criticism and comment and, on the other, the freedom of access by citizens to the documents of the state administration and the possibility to voice and publish one's own viewpoints. Openness of action by the authorities is a prerequisite for avoiding future repetition of the practice of concealment of harmful, selfish, illegal, or even criminal decisions made behind the screen of state secret. Restrictions of these freedoms as well as of openness may be dictated only by the need to protect legally specified fundamental values and interests of the entire society. For example, the voicing of opinions that insult the moral and religious feelings of society, the violation of state secrets and the voicing of opinions that undermine international alliances, should be subject to restrictions.

There is a need for a legal definition of the permissible bounds of intervention by censorship, its subjection to judicial control, and the introduction of the prnncíple that interventions by censors be made visible in texts. Restrictions on censorship must be accompanied by assuring public access to state media such as radio, television, and publishing houses, and by making available to all legally operating associations the resources needed for independent publishing activity. Mass media, especially radio and TV, should be subjected to public supervision.

3. Principles of Cadre Selection

The cadre policy so far has not assured the proper selection of persons for managerial positions, reserved almost exclusively for party members, with the party apparatus having the decisive voice on their staffing. This situation represents a restriction ff civic rights, since an overwhelming majority of citizens is discriminated against in access to managerial positions and society has no influence on their staffing. Many managerial positions are held by unfit individuals who do not enjoy authority among the workers. This results in considerable loss to both broadly conceived culture and the national economy.

In such a situation it is necessary as soon as possible /to open access to managerial positions to all citizens with appropriate occupational or professional qualifications,/ on assuring public supervision of the staffing of these positions. In this connection managerial positions should be staffed with competent individuals who are accepted by the crews of labor establishments. The nomenclature principle can be applied only with respect to political positions.

4. Self-Government and the People's Councils

We support actions in favor of genuine self-government. We especially support actions in favor of judicial self-government, which is a precondition for independence of the courts, as well as action in favor of the autonomy of higher schools and self-government of scientific research centers, which is a prerequisite for an undisturbed development of basic research and the complete upbringing of new generations of experts. We view the independent student movement as an authentic social force which will actively contribute to a more democratic shape of the future. The trade union also expresses its support of the strivings for a fully autonomous activity by creative, scientific, social, cultural, regional, and other associations.

A separate issue--which is of basic importance to the entire nation--is /the assurance of Polish farmer with full rights for an independent and self-governing occupational and professional movement/ benefiting from the same rights as our trade union. We shall support the farmers in the struggle for their rights and provide them with broad legal, organizational, and other assistance.

Furthermore, another important form of self-government is the cooperative organizations, which in this country have a long tradition. The cooperatives should again be worthy of their name. In practice so far, citizens have no influence on the composition of the representative bodies of people's councils. Elections here are to a large extent fictitious. The members of these councils need not court the support of voters, and hence they do not adequately represent their interests. The people's councils so far have not only failed to sufficiently protect the interests of the population in their respective regions but also in many cases tolerated corruption, illegal privileges, pilferage, and waste.

Our trade union, guiding itself by the best conceived interests of the working people, shoudl turn to the authorities for a change in this situation. In particular, we should strive for:

--changes in the procedure of voting for people's councils so that voters would indeed elect one of several candidates;

--the acceptance of the principle that anyone can be a candidate for elections to people's councils if he or she is supported by an appropriate number of citizens;

--the organization of new elections to people's councils before the end of this year, on the basis of a democratized voting procedure.

V. Life of the Trade Union

1. Local and Professional-Occupational Structure of the Trade Union

Our trade union has not yet built its own complete organizational structure, but even now it can be stated that its principle of being based on /a fundamental regional bond assuring mutual assistance and solidarity among working people in various occupations and professions and from various labor establishments/ has proved itself. The local structure of the trade union best assures the protection of the interests of workers and provides the optimal conditions for negotiations with the authorities and administration at national, regional, local, and plant levels.

However, the trade union /also fully recognizes that certain occupational, professional, and industrial-sector sections are formed within the framework of local structure. These sections comprise plant trade union organizations pertaining to specific industrial sectors, or interplant occupational or professional circles. They provide members of regional-level councils or consultative commission on whose initiative, in their turn, officers of the national-level section are chosen. This is how the interests and needs of individual categories of workers should be protected at local elements of the trade union. /As for the subordination of industrial-sector and occupational and professional commissions to the local and national authorities of the trade union, it assures the protection of the common interests of the workers./

The trade union faces the great problem of organizing properly the structure of these sections and commissions and determining proper relations between the principal offices of the trade union--that is, regional and national offices--and the industrial-sector and occupational and professional sections.

The chief tasks of a section include the preparation of drafts of collective bargaining agreements and other documents relating to issues that concern workers employed in the concerned industrial sector. In addition, they have the task of initiating other projects pertaining to, e.g., occupational or professional trade union authorities may also entrust to occupational, professional, or industrial-sector sections and exercise of other functions. In everyday trade union activities, occupational, professional, and industrial-sector problems are of vital concern; this ensues both from the traditions of the old industrial-sector structure of the trade unions and from current needs. Hence, questions relating to the proper relationships between the sections and the trade union authorities, the division and scope of their tasks, and the procedure for the emergence of authorities from among them, etc., urgently require widespread discussion.

2. Basic Principles of Democracy and Trade Union Activities

We want our trade union to be independent and we are aware of what that means. We want it to be self-governing and democratic and to radiate democracy throughout public life in the entire country. The rights and experience of the trade union warrant outlining the principles defining the nature of our trade union democracy and activities.

First, /all members are equal./ Every member of the trade union has equal rights and only one vote, as well as the right of freedly commenting on trade union topics. There are no better and no worse members of the trade union, regardless of the functions that they may be exercising and that may entail temporary power to undertake decisions in thename of the other members.

Second, /the holding of an office in the trade union is in the nature of providing a service and a representation/. No officer of the trade union is anything more than an authorized representative of the voters who is to be their servant and the servant of the trade union as a whole. Hence follows the duty of keeping one's voters regularly and fully informed about the decisions adopted and their causes. Hence also follows removal from posts held in the trade union in the event that such is the will of the voters. Effective action by the trade union is possible only if it is properly staffed and provided with appropriate facilities and premises. The difficult material situation of the nation and of the trade union as well as the bad experiences of the former Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ) e on us, however, the maintenance of special modesty and moderation in satisfying these needs. Thrifty management of the financial resources of the trade union is necessary. The salaries of its regular personnel should be no higher than their counterparts in the national economy.

Third, /trade union activities are based on openness./ The equality and service-providing nature of trade union functions acquire a real significance only if there is openness of action by all elements of the trade union. In particular, all negotiations with the government, with representatives of the employer, must be conducted openly. Trade union members must be enabled to consult the documents of the trade union authorities and their agencies. These, in their turn, must use every means to keep the largest possible number of members informed about the actual problems and the measures taken. A special role here is to be fulfilled by the trade union chapters and circles, whose task it is not only to provide information about the positions taken by the trade union management but also about the positions taken by the individual trade union chapters, and to actively procure the fullest possible information on trade union activities.

Fourth, /the trade union acts in accordance with the principle of solidarity./ This is the fundamental reason why the individual self-governing plant trade union chapters belong to the general community of working people joined by their solidarity. This is most clearly exemplified by the strikes at individual plants of regions which were started out of a feeling of solidarity with and the wish to assist strike elsewhere. Thus, this universal solidarity imbues our trade union with a special identity, because, in our own interest, we adopt decisions that correspond to the interests of others. The maintenance of solidarity requires regular collaboration an exchange of information among the inplant trade union chapters from different industrial sectors and regions, regardless of the local structure of the trade union.

Fifth, /the members of the trade union are bound together by common agreements./ The charter of the trade union and resolutions by plant worker meetings are binding on all members of the local organization, even on those who voted "against." Adaptation to democratically adopted common agreements is necessary even when failure to follow them would produce temporary advantages. Legality

within the trade union--and it is precisely our charter and various resolutions that constitute our trade union legality--is an indispensable prerequisite for both effective action and democracy. This does not preclude criticism and conflicts. On the contrary, internal criticism and conflicts are signs of the trade union's health. Steady critical monitoring of the activities of the trade union and its individual components is needed, but the changes ensuing from such criticism should also be carried out in accordance with democratic principles.

The observance of the above principles in our trade union activities is no simple matter. The need for collective action in a situation of constant threat and uncertainty may sometimes cause requirements for effective action to take precedence over the principles of trade union democracy. In reality, however, the strength of the trade union lies in its democratic nature. There is no better discipline of action the the unity of those who personally take an active part in collective decisionmaking. Thus, we cannot afford to think in terms of a besieged garrison. Otherwise we would outselves adopt the very flaws in public life which we desire to struggle against.

And finally, sixth, the trade union organization employs /various forms of struggle for issues that are of concern to workers,/ e.g., intervention in cases of conflict between employee and employer, the posing of demand to the employer and authorities, the organization and direction of protest actions by plant crews, etc. /But strikes play a special role/. Let us not forget that a strike is not only the last resort but also a trial of trade union reasonableness and solidarity; its cause must thus be perceived by society as just. The cause of a striek must also be sufficiently commensurate to the attendant cost to society.

Here, the following principles should be observed:

a) the strike must be/an effective/but at the same time the least costly resort;

b) the strike must have /public support/ and hence it also entails the need to provide the public with broad information on its causes;

c) /proper selection of strike sites/is important; the locale to be selected should be the most damaging to the state employer and the least damaging to the public. The economic sectors operating directly for the needs of the population should be spared strikes.

Another important element of trade union struggle is strike negotiations (with the plant management or the authorities). Thorough advance preparation for these talks and knowledge of desirable objectives are needed. Most important, the compromise that is unavoidable in many cases should not cause conflict within the local trade union organization, but should rather add to its cohesiveness through preparations for continued struggle for their cause.

We must assure trade union democracy by means of various institutions and forms of action. The trade union press and publications should not be censured by trade union authorities so far as trade union matters are concerned. The reason is that they should be a regular source of complete information on trade union activities and or criticism of shortcomings that we shall certainly not avoid. We

must also attend to flow of information in both directions within the trade union, that is, to a regular, rapid, and detailed provision of information about the decisions and activities of the higher trade union levels to the lower levels and the membership as a whole, as well as to keeping the higher levels constantly posted about the needs and opinions of the membership. Also needed is mutual exchange of information among discrete plant trade union chapters and various regions.

3. Basic Functions of Plant Trade Union Chapters

The basis for trade union life lies in the self-governing plant trade union local, while the purpose of the higher level trade union organizations is to represent the interests of the plant locals and to democracitally adopt decisions upon regular consultation of trade union members in individual plants. Regional or national offices will decide only on matters that are of interests to the entire membership of the trade union.

Every plant trade union local must thus draft its own program of action.

The program should include the following four groups of problems:

1) /Action to protect the rights, dignity, and interests of the employees/ of the concerned labor establishment. This entails monitoring the activities of the plant management and its individual services. This also requires regular monitoring of working conditions and of decisions concerning wages, promotions, transfers, awards, allowances, and leaves. The plant local protects the interests of its members as well as of all employees regardless of whether they belong to the trade union or not. It also strives to develop comradeship among workers and their commitment to an effective organization of the plant's performance.

2) /Satisfaction of the social and spiritual needs of the local's members and their families/. The plant local should constitute a living community that undertakes various measures to strengthen trade union solidarity and personality development among members. On cooperating with other plant organizations or specialized services of the trade union, it is necessary to develop sports, recreational, educational, and cultural activities. Shared experiences bring people together and prepare them for united action in a threatening situation, especially when it is time for energetic struggle in the defense of their rights.

Every plant local should, within the framework of its particular structure of self-government, develop its own ways of accomplishing these tasks. These matters are of an importance equal to that of the defense of economic interests. This is because our trade union sets itself the task of developing the personality of working people and is desirous to assist in enriching their spiritual life, and, finally, is desirous to foster family life among its members. It thus should develop an amateur sports movement and cultural movement, as well as participation in activities of worker universities with the broadest possible range of topics, shared spending of leisure time, tourism, excursions, and various forms of collective celebration of trade union holidays.

3) /The question of the procedure for remunerating the employees of the plant locals of the trade union requires comprehensive discussion/. All (or some) of them may receive their salaries from the labor establishment, which is obligated by legislation to release them from their occupational duties so that they may perform trade union duties. This solution may provide the trade union with substantial savings, and may be carried out by the labor establishment pursuant to the law. Another solution would be to defray all personal expenditures of plant trade union locals from the budget of the trade union, which would emphasize the complete independence of the trade union. The plant workers employed in the plant local of the trade union would receive unpaid leaves from the plant.

If the former solution is adopted, that is, if plant trade union employees are paid by the plant, it would be necessary to resolve the question of whether these salaries should be paid only to trade union employees (secretaries, bookkeepers, wage and benefits experts, legal advisers, etc.), or whether they should also be paid to elected trade union officials.

4) /Monitoring the activities of the basic elements of the trade union and cooperation with other plant organizations/. It is the duty of every trade union member to constantly watch over the activities of his representatives so that they may be in accord with the interests of the members and the principles of trade union democracy. Accordingly, too, any improper behavior requires criticism or even recall of the improperly behaving trade union functionary from his post.

VI. Conclusion

Solidarity represents the principal guarantee of the process of renewal. There is no other social force in Poland that could replace it in this cause. Striding on the path of renewal we must be resolute and ready to make sacrifices. Either Solidarity will transform its social environment or the traditional system will impose on it its standards and objectives, paralyze our efforts, and ultimately absorb us and nullify the hopes for a rebirth. There is no return from the road taken. We can only go forward toward the complete renewal of this country.

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TREATMENT OF CENTRAL CONGRESS COMMISSION'S WORK DUSCUSSED

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 17, 25 Apr 81 p 8

[Article by Michal Ksiezarczyk]

[Text] "In Team I of the Central Congress Commission [CKZ] we gave serious and thorough consideration to each and every demand addressed to us," is one opinion. "I am surprised that the materials prepared by the Central Commission contain so so few of our suggestions," is another opinion. So, how should it be? Should the CKZ reflect the opinions, proposals, and conclusions coming from the party organizations or from the provincial precongressional commissions, or should it force upon others its own solutions and mode of thinking?

The Team I of the CKZ, assisted by the Institute of Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism, called a special conference to discuss the role of the party in the process of socialist renewal. Its participants came from various provinces. They knew little or nothing of each other's activities; their knowledge was often limited to hearsay (usually reaching them from the party upper echelons) about heresies, factionalism, schism, and even about the formation of a new party.

Kdzislaw Kurowski (Central Committee secretary and chairman of Team I of the CKZ) in his address focused on the role of the party: "Attempts to limit the role of the party to its ideological leadership ought to be considered a utopian and idealistic proposal, contradicting the Leninist concept of the party of a new type. At the same time it is necessary tnd urgent to decisively eliminate any and all age-old degenerations from the means and methods of execution of the leading role of the party."

The reports were listened to with some impatience; most particpatns were more interested in the scheduled discussion. There the speakers spoke with varied voices, from revolutionary to clearly conservative ones. Interestingly enough, those who delivered the most radical speeches presented their views on behalf of their party organizations, while those representing conservative views spoke in their own name. At the same time, it became fashionable to be hard-headed: when somebody intends to make a conservative comment he immediately announces that he is hard-headed without waiting for the reaction of his speech.

And the discussion went as follows.

Ludwick Krasucki: "The enemies of our party contend that it cannot be reformed. Some of us say that there is no need for reforms. And yet, we will not be able to reach the reform stage of our political system without instituting a reform of our party."

Some say that the grassroots movement in the party is an outgrowth of the trade union movement. Some look for devils in it, while others are lenient in their attitude, treating this movement like a rush which will soon disappear. But the grassroots movement has only one wish: to reach an agreement with the party leadership. The first question was: Against whom? Then came: Against what? Now an answer is being sought to the question: "For what?" It will be also necessary to find an answer to the question: "For whom?"

Democratic centralism. Let us agree that so far we have not had a chance to experience democratic centralism; what we have had was autocratic centralism. The term is worn out, but the practical meaning has not been tried yet at all. The democratization of relations within the party is not based on the premise that some are given something that is not taken away from others. We cannot take away too much from the top at the expense of centralism and we cannot give too little at the grassroots level at the expense of democracy.

The following themes were frequently repeated in the speeches: the need for changes in the party; giving the right dimensions to the concept of democratic centralism; and the utilization of the grassroots movement in the party and of the now forming horizontal structures.

Lech Witkowski, Torun: "What is decisive now is whether our party can develop a new political thought. The basic party organizations have been used to listening to everything but to themselves. We have yet to be informed about the discussion which took place at the Eighth Party Congress; we requested this information through official channels and were told that ours was an isolated request. That is why we need horizontal contact so that isolation can be avoided."

Zbigniew Kamecki, Warszawa: "What strikes and bothers me is that the new Statute proposal focuses too much on the party echelons and too little on the party organizations themselves. At the same time, the principles of the activity of the party apparatus ought to be defined in the Statute and not by the Central Committee. The Statute must clearly state the executive powers of the apparatus. Furthermore, the service time in the apparatus should be limited as well, because even the smartest people will turn into dummies if they spend their entire adult life in the student, youth, and finally party apparatus."

Representative of the Voivodship Precongress Commission [WKP] from Bialystok (names are of little importance here, becauee the views expressed are not private): "We have to say clearly what is the meaning of renewal, what we are going to do to achieve it. We can no longer use the old language such as 'It is necessary to make attempts,' or 'We will take action for.' And why do we have to wait until the congress to limit the nomenclature, the tremendous expansion of which is so widely critized? Why do we have to wait to change the structure of the committees in the areas where their departments duplicate the ministries?"

Wieslaw Ciesielski, Mielec: "Which clauses in the Statute will protect us against scoundrels in the party, and particularly in its leadership? The practice will be our guide and it will ultimately decide even if we write in the Statute anything we want."

Representative of the WPK from Szczecin: "It is a pity that we were in a hurry, that we prepared for a quick congress. We at the grassroots level will not survive another conflict. The party must have centralism, but this cannot be a synonym of ordering."

Slawomir Bautenbach, WPK in Gdansk: "After every crisis the new team says that it will be better: 'It's time to work, we know what to do, leave governing to us.' What has been happening in the last 7 months--including the formation of the CKZ--proves that the actions of the leadership were motivated by such an attitude. We need an action program, its lack only deepens the confidence crisis. The lack of a program of reforms in the party strengthens not just the conservative and dogmatic elements, but also the enemies of our political system. One can hear that the Gdansk party organization together with 'Solidarity' places itself in opposition to the central policy. You should have come to Gdansk in August and have seen these central authorities in action..."

Gdansk again: "Since we can hear voices from the Warsaw Precongress Commission and the Party Higher School of Social Sciences complaining that the horizontal structures are bad, I wish to ask when was the last time that they attended a party meeting at an industrial enterprise. As the people at the grassroots level think intensively today what to do, the top does not think at all; we are pressured by the work force, Enterprise Committee, 'Solidarity,' and Industrial Sector Unions. We do not have a monopoly on rightfulness, but we demand that the central materials include alternative proposals from the WKP." The next speaker was Julitta Glebocka from the Party Higher School of Social Sciences. She stated that it is not necessary to discuss the party's managerial or leadership roles, because the party is here to govern; that some want for Poland "some kind of so-called socialism" instead of scientific socialism, and they do not aim to rebuild the PZPR as a Marxist-Leninist party, but they aim at the so-called renewal of the PZPR in the form of a social democratic party or something close to the model of an American party.

These views on rebuilding and renewal of the PZPR do exist, but they were not expressed at the conference. Who were these criticisms directed at, then?

Professor Doktor Kazimierz addressed the vocabulary issues: "I am proposing to remove from the materials the work 'return,' so we would not have to return to the economic balance, because we have never had one, or to return to Leninist principles, becuase they never have been used."

Forty people spoke during the discussion. There was no summing up at the end, the Ninth Party Congress will bring it. Zdzislaw Kurowski named tow factors which will have a decisive impact on the course of the congress: first, working out of a party program by the entire membership; and second, confidence in the bodies preparing the congress, that is the CKZ and the Central Committee. It is necessary to get rid of biases, quickly improve what was wrong, and properly define our attitude to the grassroots-level movement. Does it mean complete thaw or just the breaking of the first ice? Secretary Kurowski maintains that there is no time now for ice breaking, we need full spring.

8609
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MILITARY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION TO BE INCREASED

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 5 Feb 81 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Col (academy graduate) Henryk Styburski, Chief of Rations Services, Quartermaster's Office Polish Army by Senior Warrant Officer Iadeusz Peklo: "We Will Doublt Military Agricultural Production by 1985"; Date and Place Not Given]

[Text] [Question] With an appreciation of the social value of increasing agricultural production in the armed forces, in recent years the army has undertaken a number of activities to make the cultivation of agricultural lands more efficient and has also designated facilities for this purpose. The main effort has been concentrated on agricultural use of lands on the edges of ranges, airfields, training areas and other areas which are available to the army for raising grain and fodder crops, and on increasing pig fattening and sheep raising using its own fodder base. It is also planned to expand production of canned fruits and vegetables for the military community. What has been undertaken and achieved in this area?

[Answer] Carrying out these assignments has required multifaceted activity. We needed more experience and lacked many essential elements for expanding this form of agriculture. We minimized these shortcomings by means of fervor and conscious activism. The results have been gratifying: We have doubled the amount of cropland under cultivation and have greatly increased the livestock inventory. This has produced a 50 percent increase in the output of slaughter pork. The total value of agricultural production in the army has been increased by 1 1/2 times.

Thanks to the efforts of the services' aktiv at various levels, in nine garrisons we have organized farming operations on a scale larger than usual for military conditions; in these we have planned and achieved a large increase and specialization of production. We plan to use the profits to supplement the soldiers' rations and make them more attractive, to improve the equipment of military social-domestic units and to further expand our operations.

[Question] These accomplishments do not, of course, exhaust the possibilities for expanding military agriculture. There are other possibilities, so far unused, for increasing crop and livestock production. In what direction will the main efforts be focused in the current five-year plan?

[Answer] They will be aimed at increasing the efficiency of production and at making full use of available potential, as specified in the joint instructions of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo and the Presidium of the Supreme Committee of the United Peasant Party on 21 January of this year. In accordance with its requirements, identifying and fully utilizing all agricultural potential in the army is an essential duty in which command, housekeeping and social components of the armed forces must involve themselves.

It is a fact that the army still has much larger areas of cropland and numbers of buildings which have not yet been used for agriculture. These possibilities and requirements indicate the necessity of doubling army agricultural production by 1985. Among other things, we aim to make the army relatively self-sufficient in the foods that can be obtained from military agriculture and to increase livestock production considerably in order to supplement the rations of the armed forces community. We will achieve this goal by full utilization of land in military areas for crop production, especially for fodder and vegetables. We also wish to expand pig fattening and livestock raising, relying on our own fodder resources. We will also undertake new branches of production such as fruit growing, beekeeping, poultry and fish raising, in keeping with the different local conditions.

[Question] Expansion of agricultural production will certainly require investment in livestock buildings, and as we know, the investment situation is and will continue to be quite bad.

[Answer] Therefore we will have to make full use of all livestock buildings and other buildings which can be used for stock raising after the necessary adaptations. In view of the limitations on investment funds, we will have to concentrate on economical construction, using, for example, rejected materials, used railway ties, wind-downed trees from forests on military lands and the like, utilizing the capabilities of military processing units.

[Question] In view of the current meat situation on the market, it is easy to guess that the most important task of military agriculture will be that of stepping up pig raising.

[Answer] This is the main aim of our efforts. We will also increase pig fattening at garrison bakeries, depots, production bases and the like. For this purpose we must make maximum use of kitchen wastes and fodder produced in our own area, with the possibility of purchasing concentrated fodder in exchange for grain. The increase in the livestock inventory must be accompanied by more efficient use of fodder. We plan to increase the number of piglets from each sow to at least 17 a year, and also to increase rotation of fattening pigs so as to gain a minimum of 180 kilograms of live pork per feed stall. We will concentrate on fattening in a closed cycle, which will assure that we obtain high-quality pigs; and the garrison pig yards which we have organized will make possible greater fattening effectiveness.

[Question] But other aspects of the expansion of military agricultural production are equally important.

[Answer] We are continuing to encourage, where conditions are favorable, the raising of beef cattle, the expansion of vegetable growing, and particularly fish raising, for which there is great potential by using ponds, lakes and streams on military lands.

The structure of crop production should be arranged in accordance with the requirement to expand pig fattening and livestock raising. An increase in fertilization and the suitable use of agrotechnical measures and pesticides will have the effect, we expect, of increasing yields of the four grains to 29 to 30 quintals per hectare and that of potatoes to 200 quintals per hectare. If insufficient fodder is available for the requirements of livestock production, we will consider the possibility of taking over uncultivated lands from the State Land Fund.

An important question is that of raising vegetables in greenhouses, plastic hothouses and the fields--both early vegetables and field vegetables. Instead of flowers and ornamental shrubs we recommend the cultivation of fruit-bearing trees and shrubs in so-called "small architecture" and in side spaces and along the roads through military reservations.

In canning, we expect to fully supply our needs for pickled cabbage and cucumbers and to increase the output of stewed fruit, dried fruit, vegetable mixtures and self-cured vegetables by using our own raw-material base.

[Question] Obviously the approaches to increasing agricultural production which you have presented do not exhaust the plans and aims of military agriculture, which, to the extent that its manpower and capabilities allow, has the ambition of relieving the national economy of the necessity of supplying part of the food for the armed forces.

[Answer] In order to formulate the assignments for the current five-year plan, we have developed assumptions on the development of military agricultural production, which have been delivered to all elements of the army. We proceed on the assumption that the forecasts should come from below and should take account of potential, capabilities and cost effectiveness. We expect that the discussion of these assumptions now going on in the units will call forth new initiatives. The country's difficult food situation demands that we make use of all possibilities for expanding crop and livestock production. The sum total of these undertakings implemented with the political and social support of the military community will be participation of the army in the expansion of agriculture; this will contribute directly to improvement of the provisioning of the fighting man and of army civilian workers. The demand of the moment is full utilization of all existing reserves and possibilities for expanding military agriculture.

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UNAUTHORIZED ACTION BY ISLAMIC GROUP IN ZAVIDOVICI

[Editorial Report] The 1 May 1981 issue of PREPOROD (Sarajevo, page 2), organ of the Community of Islamic Elders of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia carries a warning against the unauthorized use of the official seal and other actions by the former president, Fejzic Hasan, and members of the governing council of the Islamic Community in Zavidovici who continue to carry out their functions although they were replaced in April 1980 by the assembly of the above Islamic Elders Community.

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BRIEFS

EXPULSIONS IN SUVA REKA--The Suva Reka Opstina assembly decided to take measures against violation of self-management rights and poor inter-personal relations in the "Jeta e re" (New Life) School Center there. The basic LC organization and all self-management organs were dissolved. A commission was formed to take measures to bring the situation in order in this school center. Five teachers were suspended for hostile actions, 10 students were expelled, and legal action is being initiated against 25 students. In regard to work organizations in Suva Reka, five production workers were suspended because of hostile action, while 11 were expelled from the party. The opstina LC committee is in the process of eliminating enemy elements and those who are not in accord with the party line. [Excerpt] [Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 19 May 81 p 3]

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